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Chapter One: The Introduction 
Writing remains a politically vigorous means of constructing visibility, 
accountability and the meaning of time. Many (different) feminist writers 
complement [the] conviction that, in order to both imagine a world free of gender 
injustice and to understand the intersecting vectors of racism and misogyny under 
current capitalist interests, access to knowledges of women’s experiences in the 
past is crucial.  
– Jane Bennett, Professor of Political Theory at Johns Hopkins University, 20071 
 
Introduction 
 On Christmas Eve in 1975, David Berkowitz set out on what would begin a 20-month 
hunting spree that would take the lives of 6 individuals, terrorize countless others, and leave 
behind a trail of letters for New York law enforcement and media outlets. On December 6, 1989, 
Marc Lépine entered a Montreal engineering school’s classroom, separated the students by 
gender, and went on to murder 14 women before taking his own life, leaving behind a suicide 
note naming 19 other women he wanted to kill but was unable to get to in time. On May 23, 
2014, Elliot Rodger took to the streets of Isla Vista, California after murdering his two 
roommates in their apartment. He would go on to kill 4 more individuals before taking his own 
life, and would leave behind both a written and video manifesto published online. On September 
9, 2020, David Kaufman was arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on charges of 
transmitting threatening interstate communications and stalking.2 He had been under a year-long 
FBI investigation for the alleged harassment of a former female college acquaintance and her 
loved ones, having allegedly gone by online pseudonyms such as “Big Man,” “John Murray,” 
and “David Khalifa.”3 Kaufman is a self-described member of the incel movement, and an avid 
                                               
1 Denise Buiten, “Silences Stifling Transformation: Misogyny and Gender-Based Violence in the Media,” Agenda: 
Empowering Women for Gender Equality, No. 71, (2007): 117, https://www.jstor.org/stable/27739254. 
2 “United States v. Kaufman: Indictment,” United States District Court Southern District of New York, Case 7:20-cr-
00577-NSR, Document 9, Filed 10/26/20.    
3 Seamus Hughes, “FBI’s Terror Hunters Turn to a Different Threat: Incels,” Daily Beast, September 9, 2020, 
https://www.thedailybeast.com/fbis-terror-hunters-turn-to-a-different-threat-incels. 
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supporter of Elliot Rodger. An example of one of his alleged posts states, “I'll have sex with a 
woman one day. One way or another [wink emoji].”4 
On paper, these four cases have little in common. Berkowitz is a serial murderer, Lépine 
was a mass shooter, Rodger was an incel active shooter, and Kaufman is a self-proclaimed incel 
who allegedly executed a year-long campaign of harassment and rape and death threats that were 
inspired by Elliot Rodger. In academic datasets and typologies, these four cases would rarely be 
included together. The missing link between these four individuals and others like them is the 
collective acknowledgement of a foundational violent extremist ideology – a violent 
misogynistic ideology. This study lays the conceptual framework for the various stakeholders 
affected by active ideological shooters targeting women, and acting out of societal grievances 
against the female gender.      
Research Question 
Active shooters ideologically motivated by misogyny have been mischaracterized and 
under-researched, and this distortion of the research began long before Elliot Rodger’s Isla Vista 
attack in 2014. The investigation of active shooters without careful consideration of their 
underlying misogynist motivations has resulted in these actors being significantly misrepresented 
in the various disciplines that take up questions of national security, counter-terrorism, and 
targeted violence. Thus, counter- and prevention efforts against this type of shooter have been 
misled. For the purpose of this thesis, this phenomenon will be referred to as FEM-V, or Female-
Centric Extremist Motivated Violence. 
This thesis will identify traits associated with actors who fall within the parameters of this 
phenomenon, provide explicit examples of such individuals, and offer a conceptual framework of 
                                               
4 Hughes, “FBI’s Terror Hunters Turn to a Different Threat.” 
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the FEM-V category. This thesis will additionally provide a conceptual framework to be used as 
a reference tool and foundational model for the various stakeholders impacted by the FEM-V 
phenomenon. By more accurately representing these individuals, academics and researchers can 
better prepare, profile, and prosecute inside of their respective spheres of influence. 
This thesis will also reconceptualize the foundational criteria used for “terrorism.” It is 
the general consensus among academics in the field of security studies that terrorism (1) requires 
an audience, (2) is communicative violence, (3) targets civilians, and (4) is ideologically and/or 
politically motivated. The criteria for terrorism also currently exclude idiosyncratic acts of 
personal gain. This thesis will reconceptualize what is currently understood as idiosyncratic 
personal gain, because for FEM-V actors, “personal glory” should not be held equivalent to an 
active shooter killing for money. Personal glory for FEM-V terrorists is a foundational piece of 
their collective ideology. 
In most instances where an active shooter event is being considered as an act of terrorism, 
cases have been quickly ruled out if ties to personal glory or profit can be made. However, FEM-
V shooters share a collective ideology that women, or the societal expectations of men because 
of women, have held these men down their entire lives. Therefore, the moment of glory that 
these shooters are plotting, carrying out, and inciting in others becomes the way that these men 
win over women. FEM-V terrorists manifest their hatred of women in these moments of glory, or 
acts of violence and celebrity which these male perpetrators believe are deserved or a personal 
right. Regarding calls to action, every event that is documented – including but not limited to 
video manifestos, written manifestos, and social media – is an unspoken, if not explicit, call to 
action for others either completely like them or aspiring to become one of them. 
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In acts of FEM-V terrorism, personal glory is a crucial component of the violent 
misogynist terroristic ideology; this terrorism is ideologically and/or politically motivated to give 
the individual actor a leg up on society. This is a merging of an exploration of terrorism as a 
mediated act for gaining “celebrity,” even if to do it they need to “go out in a blaze of glory.” In 
regard to the serial killer aspect of this study, these actors have long been profiled as having been 
driven to eliminate the “disposable classes,”5 such as those marginalized and ostracized by 
society. However, an analysis has yet to surface that considers serial killer typologies and their 
motivations to kill with that of modern active ideological shooters who are also driven to murder 
human beings. Furthermore, a connection has yet to be made between violent misogyny, active 
shooter motivations, and confidence that the current list of violent extremist ideologies being 
considered in security studies for driving active ideological shooters is exhaustive.   
The FEM-V phenomenon is not only looking at current-day incel active shooters, though 
incels are arguably the most well-known community of anti-women active shooters in 2021. 
Instead, FEM-V considers all violent misogynistic active shooter profiles that may or may not 
have formal affiliations to a violent misogynistic community, either before or after the dawning 
of the internet and incel movement. In other words, a group like al-Qaeda is to jihadists what 
incels are to FEM-V. FEM-V also inevitably includes a certain array of serial killers. While 
misogynistic serial killers such as David Berkowitz may have engaged in a different concept of 
killing (i.e. “the love of the hunt” and hunting for a long span of time), by merely labeling Ted 
                                               
5 Kevin D. Haggerty, “Modern Serial Killers,” Crime, Media, Culture 5, no. 2 (August 2009): 183, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1741659009335714, “One of the four main typologies of serial killers identified in their 
influential work, a defining characteristic of such murderers, is that they see it as a calling to rid society of particular 
types of people. Here the murder of members of the disposable classes is explicitly connected with progressive 
social objectives.”  
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Bundy and David Berkowitz as the same type of killer, the origins of the incel movement as it is 
known today were missed. This study aims to prevent future movements from being overlooked.   
There is, in fact, a blending of fringes, making certain categorical serial killers both serial 
killers and FEM-V terrorists. By having missed the origin story, the stakeholders surrounding 
this phenomenon have also missed proper labeling, profiling, and handling of these shooters 
from the beginning. This type of violence is, in essence, designed specifically to terrorize 
women, and has not truly been properly addressed within the larger scheme of terrorism. It is 
critical that a conceptual framework be designed for this category of murderers, or else these 
events will continue recurring, and the phenomenon will continue growing in terms of threat 
level and in support. 
Most analysts of terrorism would say that attaining “celebrity” is a personal gain, no 
different than killing for money. Yet the following case studies indeed can be categorized as 
terrorists, given that their collective ideology is glory-centric, and these four men are of 
particular significance for three primary reasons: (1) they span the time period of interest, (2) 
there are both patterns and explicit connections between each of the cases, and (3) they prove 
this study’s argument that no male active ideological shooter is currently appropriately being 
categorized by scholars and policymakers in the security studies field. This analysis will assess 
in detail the cases of famed serial killer David Berkowitz, mass shooter Marc Lépine, incel active 
shooter Elliot Rodger, and recently arrested incel David Kaufman. David Berkowitz is a FEM-V 
terrorist because, in line with both the traditional criteria for “terrorism” as well as the 
idiosyncratic addition provided by this study, his audience was two-fold: critical members of the 
Omega task force designed to catch him, and the audiences of New York’s media outlets. 
Berkowitz made his acts of violence communicative as well, through various letters written to 
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law enforcement and local media outlets. Berkowitz’s targets were not just civilians in general, 
but specifically young women with long, dark hair who went on dates at night. His acts 
terrorized the city and surrounding boroughs by threatening women fitting that criteria to cut and 
dye their hair, and stop socializing at night. Berkowitz’s acts were ideologically motivated in his 
disdain for society – young women, especially – ignoring him. He made sure that society began 
paying him the attention he felt he deserved, by targeting those whom he claimed received the 
most attention in life naturally, as seen in one of his letters: 
Everybody mourns more for pretty girls, more than ugly. Pretty girls always get 
more attention in life. Guys lay down their lives for them . . . I mean some pretty 
girls at eighteen lived three times over, with all the attention they got. If a pretty 
one dies, what the hell. She had a good time.6 
 
Marc Lépine also fits the FEM-V criteria, and his audience was also two-fold. His 
primary audience was arguably other FEM-V males who were seeking a call-to-action and 
needed targets, since his manifesto listed nineteen women he was unable to reach the day of his 
shooting spree. His secondary audience was the society that allowed women to take on 
stereotypically male occupations, such as engineering. Similar to Berkowitz, Lépine’s violence 
was also communicative, and possibly even more communicative: he left a formal manifesto, 
versus Berkowitz’s chain of letters. Lépine also targeted civilians. More specifically, he targeted 
female engineering students. Lastly, Lépine was also motivated by the FEM-V ideology. As 
translated from his French manifesto:  
Would you note that if I commit suicide today 89-12-06 it is not for economic 
reasons (for I have waited until I exhausted all my financial means, even refusing 
jobs) but for political reasons. Because I have decided to send the feminists, who 
                                               
6 Lawrence Klausner, Son of Sam: Based on the Authorized Transcription of the Tapes, Official Documents, and 
Diaries of David Berkowitz, New York: Simon and Schuster (2017): 41.  
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have always ruined my life, to their Maker. For seven years life has brought me 
no joy and [has been] totally blasé, I have decided to put an end to those viragos.7 
Elliot Rodger is the third FEM-V terrorist case, and he had two primary audiences: the 
online incel community, in order to call others to action, and the society that had supposedly 
oppressed him, the self-proclaimed “Supreme Gentleman.” By both posting a video manifesto to 
YouTube and a written manifesto to online forums moments before his shooting spree began, his 
violence was also aimed at being extremely communicative – and his acts indeed targeted 
civilians. Rodger was motivated by FEM-V as well. As stated in the introduction of his written 
manifesto, “My Twisted World: The Story of Elliot Rodger,”  
Humanity . . . All of my suffering on this world has been at the hands of 
humanity, particularly women. It has made me realize just how brutal and twisted 
humanity is as a species. All I ever wanted was to fit in and live a happy life 
amongst humanity, but I was cast out and rejected, forced to endure an existence 
of loneliness and insignificance, all because the females of the human species 
were incapable of seeing the value in me.8 
   Finally, David Kaufman, largely unknown to the general public or reader. While he was 
arrested before ever officially committing physical FEM-V acts against his targets, he is a 
significant piece of the FEM-V phenomenon and future research associated with this study. His 
inspiration and tactics are completely embedded within the foundational FEM-V web. 
While not much has been released regarding his case, Kaufman was investigated by the 
FBI for a little over a year, and was officially arrested on September 9, 2020. An unsealed 
complaint filed by the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) detailed a “year-long campaign of 
harassment, rape, and death threats levied at a Long Island couple by David Kaufman, a self-
described member of the ‘incel’ movement and supporter of one of its most notorious murderers, 
                                               
7 Peter Langman, “Marc Lépine’s Suicide Note,” School Shooters Info (2014), 
https://schoolshooters.info/sites/default/files/lepine_note_1.1.pdf. 
8 Elliot Rodger, “My Twisted World: The Story of Elliot Rodger,” (2014): 1. 
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Elliot Rodger.”9 He had been targeting an old female college acquaintance, her significant other, 
and their friends after undergoing years of silence post-graduation. His alleged harassment began 
over Facebook, and continued to spread across various social media platforms, such as Twitter 
and YouTube. His alleged messages of harassment were arguably fueled by the college 
acquaintance having rejected and deprived him “of sex to which he believed he was entitled;”10 
Kaufman also allegedly claimed that “it should be illegal for a woman to say no”11 to sex. As of 
March 2021, Kaufman was awaiting trial for one count of transmitting threatening interstate 
communications, and one count of stalking.12 As more information on Kaufman’s case is 
revealed, FEM-V will hopefully be proven to have even more significance to current and 
ongoing gender-based violent events.  
This thesis will also evaluate four primary active shooter dataset studies that have been 
heavily relied upon in the field of security studies. The data itself is not problematic, it is the 
researchers’ respective interpretations in order to categorize the data that leads to the mis-
conceptualizations of FEM-V shooters. For that reason, this thesis will explain the flaws in the 
existing literature that assess active ideological shooters and their respective violent extremist 
ideologies. These datasets – Capellan, Gill et al., PIRUS, and Silva et al. – were selected because 
they not only rely on open-sources and interpretations of the relevant data, but these researchers 
provide their own interpretations as well that are then treated as primary sources for other 
researchers’ and policymakers’ analyses. By incorporating these four studies into “Boys Who 
Cry Wolf” and highlighting their respective flaws, the field of security studies and its various 
                                               
9 Hughes, “FBI’s Terror Hunters Turn to a Different Threat.” 
10 Hughes, “FBI’s Terror Hunters Turn to a Different Threat.”  
11 Hughes, “FBI’s Terror Hunters Turn to a Different Threat.” 
12 “United States v. Kaufman: Indictment.”    
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members can rebuild the foundations of how to view active shooter events of the past, present, 
and future. 
Traditionally, scholars look at these offenders in one of two ways: either these men are 
considered lone wolves that are acting on their own for their own idiosyncratic purposes, or they 
are considered to belong to one of the currently extant categories of violent extremist ideologies, 
such as far-left, far-right, or Salafi extremist. A pattern is being missed that connects a significant 
portion of these otherwise mutually exclusive shooters, and that pattern is based around violent 
misogyny, as seen in the FEM-V phenomenon. Ideologies do not have to be mutually exclusive 
amongst these shooters. This study is proving that not only do these ideologies not have to be 
mutually exclusive – because no two cases out of the four cases studied in this thesis belong in 
the same category – but also that a significant violent extremist ideology has been completely 
disregarded from consideration as one of the lead motivating ideologies for active ideological 
shooters.  
Limitations 
 This study is entirely reliant upon the extant, open-source research found within the 
disciplines of criminology, women’s and gender studies, and counterterrorism studies. Thus, it is 
pertinent to highlight potential limitations affecting the current work, in order to advance future 
research assessing the active ideological shooter phenomenon through a gendered lens. As stated 
in Silva et al.’s limitations, “mass shooting studies are often limited by definitional, temporal, 
and data collection issues.”13 This study seeks to overcome these limitations by providing an in-
depth literature review across disciplines and stakeholder communities of interest to gender-
                                               
13 Jason R. Silva et al., “Gender-Based Mass Shootings: An Examination of Attacks Motivated by Grievances 
Against Women,” Violence Against Women (2021): 19, DOI: 10.1177/1077801220981154.   
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based active ideological shooter events. However, these limitations may still ultimately influence 
the findings of this study. 
This study identified four individuals and four studies of interest to draw the necessary 
conclusions across three primary academic disciplines. An additional limitation to be considered 
is that the studies examined only provided quantitative findings, rather than qualitative case file 
analyses. Thus, evaluations made were based solely on what was readily available. This suggests 
that future research from the various authors of the four studies could reevaluate their case files 
through a gendered lens, or publish their case files for other academics to assess in conjunction 
with the FEM-V conceptual framework provided here. 
There is a severe lack of data available on active ideological shooters, and thus even less 
data can be found for active ideological shooter datasets viewed through a gendered lens. This 
study has chronological limits as well, with cases ranging from December 1975 to September 
2020, and literature ranging from mentions of familicide brought on by violent misogyny during 
the Great Depression to the verdict of Toronto van attack perpetrator Alek Minassian on March 
3, 2021. This broad research window suggests that, similar to Silva et al.’s analysis, “time-period 
effects, or the idea that older incidents are more difficult to identify . . . can then suggest an 
inaccurate increase over time,”14 resulting in a potential skew of these findings as well.  
There are also gender and geographical biases in this study, meaning that the cases 
explored and the majority of the literature focuses on North American male perpetrators 
responsible for gender-based violence against women. This was determined because the great 
majority (at least 96%) of all individuals documented in the various datasets analyzed were male, 
and the majority of the studies were North American. Nevertheless, conceptual limitations based 
                                               
14 Silva et al., “Gender-Based Mass Shootings,” 19. 
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on these biases include the remaining 4% of actors that may be responsible for male-on-male or 
female-on-male violence, as well as regional conceptual limitations.  
Additionally, this study does not consider all currently labeled serial killers as FEM-V 
terrorists, and only provides one case from the notorious serial killer era in the United States. 
Thus, future research can and should specifically explore all actors within the serial killer 
phenomenon to identify additional FEM-V actors, determine a more thorough spectrum of so-
called serial killers, and give more insight into the phenomenon from a psychological 
perspective. This particular study focuses on FEM-V killers from ex post facto manosphere 
murderers to modern day violent, misogynistic active shooters. For the purpose of this study, 
“manosphere” will be defined as a conglomeration of divergent misogynistic ideologies 
espoused and shared by groups or individuals.15 FEM-V stakeholders cannot be as quick to 
determine whether or not misogynistic killers are strictly killing out of hate or excitement. A 
deeper evaluation is needed, and this study provides the conceptual framework needed to 
continue this work.  
It is important to also address that this is an external and non-psychological assessment of 
individuals who should be categorized as having committed FEM-V acts of violence. The author 
relies on the evidence provided to argue a pattern of misogyny in each case study that points to 
them not only being what they are originally classified as, such as an “active shooter” or “serial 
killer,” but additionally as a FEM-V terrorist. Future research is encouraged to assess this 
framework through a psychological lens.  
It should also be at least briefly acknowledged that this study was produced over the 
course of the COVID-19 pandemic (May 2020 to April 2021), meaning that access was limited 
                                               
15 Alexandra Krendel, “The Men and Women, Guys and Girls of the ‘Manosphere’: A Corpus-Assisted Discourse 
Approach,” Discourse & Society 31, no. 6 (November 2020): 608, https://doi.org/10.1177/0957926520939690. 
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to physical libraries, placing a heaving reliance on what was readily available online via UNC 
Library’s subscriptions to JSTOR, UNC Library, and other online platforms. 
Outline 
 The following chapter will provide a literature review on five areas of relevance: the lone 
wolf phenomenon, serial killer characteristics, violent misogyny and its manifestations, and 
America’s domestic terrorism problem. This organization seeks to combine the various 
literatures that have yet to be connected in addressing the historic violent misogyny problem and 
its impact on national security today.  
Chapter Three examines four case studies: David Berkowitz, Marc Lépine, Elliot Rodger, 
and David Kaufman. Berkowitz acts as an example of a notorious serial killer from the serial 
killer-crazed era, Lépine is a Canadian example of violent misogyny and its manifestations, 
Elliot Rodger is arguably the best known example of a violent misogynistic actor in modern day 
America – whose legacy is affiliated with an online violent misogynistic community that incites 
violence – and David Kaufman is a prime example of what is to come if the FEM-V 
phenomenon is not properly identified, understood, and prevented.  
Chapter Four provides an in-depth analysis of four open-source dataset studies examining 
active ideological shooters from as early as 1948 and as recent as 2018. Finally, Chapter Five 
provides overarching conclusions and discusses future research that can build on the research 
and assessments provided in this study.  
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Chapter Two: The Literature 
I am the hero or villain of the narrative to follow, depending on whether you are a 
feminist or a human being. 
– “Confessions of a Lady-Killer,” 197916 
 
There have always been threats to the homeland, but they were easier to detect and 
combat before the days of the internet.17 More recently, individuals are being manipulated, 
radicalized, and incited from the privacy of their bedrooms to act either completely alone, or 
because a violent extremist movement or ideology inspired them to the point of committing 
violence on their personal playing field.18 
These actors are known today as “lone wolves,” “known wolves,” or even “loon wolves.” 
This “wolf” label has been overused and worn out, but has every possible “lone wolf” shooter 
been accounted for, and has every motivating violent extremist ideology been explained? The 
short answer is no. This section aims to problematize the “lone wolf” phenomenon as it currently 
stands, and establish that not only should the label be made extinct, but that a critical violent 
extremist ideology has yet to even be considered in the majority of the “wolf” datasets. 
Joel A. Capellan defines lone wolves as presumably suicidal, socially awkward, and 
isolated individuals who channel their personal grievances through their respective extremist 
ideologies.19 These actors project blame onto others and seek to act against those who have 
                                               
16 Jane Caputi, “American Psychos: The Serial Killer in Contemporary Fiction,” Journal of American Culture 
(December 1993): 13, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1542-734X.1993.t01-1-00101.x. 
17 In Mark D. Robinson and Cori E. Dauber, “Terrorism and Technology: The Front End,” Small Wars Journal, 
August 15, 2019, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/terrorism-and-technology-front-end, this argument is 
highlighted throughout. Robinson and Dauber provide a historical breakdown of the evolution of technology in 
correlation to terrorists’ quality and quantity of content, territory, and support.  
18 John P. Carlin, “Inside the Hunt for the World’s Most Dangerous Terrorist,” Politico Magazine, November 21, 
2018, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/11/21/junaid-hussain-most-dangerous-terrorist-cyber-hacking-
222643. 
19 Joel A. Capellan, “Lone Wolf Terrorist or Deranged Shooter? A Study of Ideological Active Shooter Events in the 
United States, 1970–2014,” 4. 
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wronged them, through either a personal or overarching societal lens.20 While the given 
definition and criteria seem to fit the mold of lone, grievance-fueled active shooters seen today, 
both the “wolf” label and these criteria leave too much room for categories to be left unspecified; 
Capellan himself only included “far-right,” “Jihad inspired,” “Black nationalist,” and “Other” – 
or offenders that “did not fall under any particular ideology”21 – as the only ideological 
motivations of lone-actor grievance-fueled shooters from 1970 to 2014. 
While Capellan’s dataset is therefore not an exhaustive list of active ideological shooters 
during that time period, his “Lone Wolf Terrorist or Deranged Shooter?” study did result in 
significant findings regarding the violent extremist ideologies included in the data. Of the 282 
active shooter events in the United States captured, an average of six events took place every 
year.22 These attacks left 905 casualties and 1,094 injured victims, with over half (160 events) 
having occurred within the last ten years of the study.23 Additionally, more ideological shooter 
attacks have “occurred since 2004 than in the previous 33 years.”24  
Without access to his case files, Capellan’s choices of dataset categories failed to identify 
any of his 282 shooters as being motivated by a violent gender-based ideology. This paper will 
argue that he should have, and that he is not alone in this misconception. He documented 12.5% 
of the ideological active shootings as having an ideological motivation, but the ideological 
category was not specific or relevant enough to separate into a stand-alone category. He also 
stated that “a closer look at ideological active shooters reveals that most attacks (70 percent) are 
motivated by ideological extremism,25 but did not provide any further information on the 
                                               
20 Capellan, “Lone Wolf Terrorist,” 4. 
21 Capellan, “Lone Wolf Terrorist,” 4. 
22 Capellan, “Lone Wolf Terrorist,” 7. 
23 Capellan, “Lone Wolf Terrorist,” 12. 
24 Capellan, “Lone Wolf Terrorist,” 12. 
25 Capellan, “Lone Wolf Terrorist,” 11. 
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remaining 30% of ideologically motivated attacks. Various scholars in the field have provided 
similar insights for stakeholders in the security community regarding the topic of active 
ideological shooters, and only one (thus far) has considered gender-based mass shootings as a 
stand-alone violent extremist ideology, which will be discussed in much more detail later. 
Khaled A. Beydoun breaks the phenomenon into a four-part typology26 of lone wolf 
terrorists, with an additional actor known as the “lone wolf killer.” As defined by Beydoun, lone 
wolf terrorism is “premeditated violence unleashed by an individual actor driven by discretely 
held views or a cogent ideology espoused by an organization.”27 These actors may share loose 
ties with a formally designated terrorist organization or hate group, or act entirely on their own.28 
Inside of his “lone wolf terrorism” umbrella, there is the (1) “lone soldier,” (2) “loner,” (3) “lone 
vanguard,” and (4) “lone follower.” Similar to Capellan, his study does not look at any actors 
explicitly through a gendered lens. Therefore, while the categories that Beydoun creates in his 
study are significant in their conceptualization, gender-based violence is a fundamental ideology 
that must be considered in the foundations of a framework such as his, which is why a 
foundational framework such as this study is of great significance.  
The “lone soldier” lone wolf terrorist (LWT) acts independently, but is a true believer in 
a terrorist organization’s ideology or ideologies, seeking to further the mission of those 
ideologies with the support of the organization.29 Loner LWTs commit their acts individually as 
well, but not necessarily because they choose to do so. Beydoun suggests that this type of shooter 
exhibits such “low social competence”30 that while they seek to join a terror organization or 
                                               
26 Khaled A. Beydoun, “Lone Wolf Terrorism: Types, Stripes, and Double Standards,” Northwestern University Law 
Review Online, vol. 112, no. 5. (February 22, 2018): 1225. 
27 Beydoun, “Lone Wolf Terrorism,” 1220.  
28 Beydoun, “Lone Wolf Terrorism,” 1220.  
29 Beydoun, “Lone Wolf Terrorism,” 1221.  
30 Beydoun, “Lone Wolf Terrorism,” 1223. 
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network, their lack of social competency hinders them from doing so. In other words, “they are 
loners as a matter of circumstance, not choice.”31 Lone vanguard LWTs are socially competent 
but they still act alone, and they act to further their individual ideology.32 These actors are fueled 
by “individually crafted ideas that may be inspired by or tied to external ideologies but are 
fundamentally idiosyncratic.”33 The last of this four-part typology is the lone follower LWT. 
This category is for lone wolves who “seize the ideology of an existing organization but lack the 
social competence needed to gain acceptance into the group.”34 Although lone follower wolves 
may share the ideology or ideologies of a particular group, these wolves “do not possess the 
social ability to become formal members of that group,”35 rather than acting and leading purely 
on their own. “Unlike loners, lone followers would prefer to be part of an existing group, though 
they lack the social skills to do so.”36 There are too many points of overlap between these four 
categories that only cause confusion and generalization, leaving FEM-V completely overlooked.  
 Beydoun includes one additional lone wolf, who is considered a non-terrorist; a “lone 
wolf killer.” As noted by Beydoun, this killer’s general demographic is white, male, and inspired 
by organizations that have yet to be deemed formal terrorist organizations by a governing body. 
Any acts of violence committed by these individuals are not investigated as acts of terrorism, nor 
are their acts ever legally tied to terrorism.37 Considering the criteria for the FEM-V 
phenomenon, FEM-V actors would not fit under the category of “lone wolf killers” either. 
Beydoun’s research – while significant in its efforts to draw more distinctions inside of the lone 
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wolf phenomenon – arguably created more grey areas instead, while continuing to exclude a 
major threat found within the lone-actor grievance-fueled phenomenon. 
Crying Wolf: The Studies 
The misleading lone wolf phenomenon continues in its overuse, as seen in various 
datasets provided by both scholars and others who set out to address who these active ideological 
shooters are, and why they act. This section will consider four primary datasets – Capellan, Gill 
et al., PIRUS, and Silva et al. – that will be elaborated on in further detail in Chapter 4. Few 
datasets exist that analyze active ideological shooters at present, and even less analyze the 
perpetrators through a gendered lens. Therefore, the following datasets are not only missing 
critical components to their research, but anytime they are respectively referenced by other 
scholars, that research is also at risk of being misleading, leaving a major gap relevant to national 
security concern and policymaking. 
Beginning with Capellan, 282 individuals were assessed between the years 1970 and 
2014. Through a gendered lens, both of those years instantly stand out. The 1970s as a whole 
were notorious for serial killers of women, such as Ted Bundy, David Berkowitz, and Kenneth 
Bianchi or the “Hillside Strangler.” Collectively, these three white men were responsible for the 
deaths of a minimum of 54 women across over 6 states in the span of 4 years, 1974 to 1978.38 In 
2014, Elliot Rodger murdered 6 people before committing suicide because of the “cruelness of 
women.”39 Nonetheless, Capellan only explicitly categorized the ideologies of “far-right,” “Jihad 
inspired,” “Black nationalist,” and “Other.” In a dataset where 282 actors were responsible for 
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905 deaths,40 four white men during that same timespan were responsible for at least 60 dead 
women fueled by violent misogyny, but were not provided their own category.      
Gill et al. focuses on terrorists’ use of the internet, arguing that the field of criminology 
“has said very little on the matter.”41 They then examine 223 “convicted United Kingdom-based 
terrorists,”42 but none of these actors were considered to be affiliated with violent misogyny or 
FEM-V-like motivators. Instead, Gill et al. assessed individuals in the following categories: 
Jihadist-inspired, extreme right wing – which compiled anti-immigration, anti-government, anti-
Muslim, and anti-Jewish sentiments – and a non-politically-oriented offender category.43      
PIRUS is a large database that has catalogued over 2,000 individuals identified with 
violent extremist ideologies so far. PIRUS is hosted by the National Consortium for the Study of 
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
Emeritus Center of Excellence headquartered at the University of Maryland (UMD). Its data was 
coded and collected by UMD graduate students and researchers using open-sources and “extant 
START research products.”44 However, the only ideologies explicitly included are Islamist, far 
right, far left, and “single issues,” or “individuals who are motivated primarily by a single issue, 
rather than a broad ideology.”45 Conceptually, PIRUS is on the right track in making room for 
the FEM-V phenomenon, considering examples of single issues to include “the Puerto Rican 
independence movement, anti-abortion extremists, members of the Jewish Defense League, and 
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extremists with idiosyncratic ideologies,”46 such as Ted Kaczynski. However, at present, the 
foundational gender-based violent motivator is left out of consideration. PIRUS should strongly 
consider adding the FEM-V category to the list of stand-alone categories currently included. 
Furthermore, START as a DHS Center of Excellence should consider examining all of their 
datasets – namely PIRUS and GTD, or Global Terrorism Database – through a FEM-V lens. One 
of the cases included in this study, Elliot Rodger, was documented by GTD as having committed 
an “Armed Assault”47 with GTD’s current coding.       
Without the proper conceptual foundation, active ideological shooter sources currently 
referenced and relied upon in academia lead other scholars down a crooked path. Doering et al. 
and Becker, for example, each used PIRUS to produce their respective findings. Doering et al. 
cites PIRUS as the primary source for their reconceptualization of the contemporary research 
categories when assessing terrorism and extremism. While using PIRUS to argue that much of 
existing research on active ideological shooters has had a jihadist-heavy focus, Doering et al. 
only concludes that a greater inclusion of right-wing and left-wing extremists should be 
considered, without any mention of a violent misogynistic ideology motivating any of the 
terrorists involved.        
Becker “examines the relationship between social control and social learning variables on 
involvement in violent vs. non-violent extremism,”48 but his study was also misled by PIRUS. 
Following PIRUS’ lead, Becker focuses on “Far Right, Far Left, Islamist, and Single-Issue 
ideologies,”49 and cites other academics such as LaFree et al. who also rely upon PIRUS to draw 
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their research conclusions. At present, by the “fruit of the poisonous tree” legal doctrine, PIRUS 
is creating a trail of incomplete analysis.  
Silva et al. was the only dataset discovered for this study that explicitly addressed the 
stand-alone threat of gender-based active shooters, but did so through the primary lens of 
domestic violence, which FEM-V does not encompass. However, two of the four typologies 
Silva et al. included – general women-targeted and general women-not targeted – are 
representative of FEM-V shooters. Future research should provide a more in-depth examination 
of these typologies through a FEM-V lens. A proper framework is absolutely critical to correct 
past studies and direct future research and analysis. 
Silva et al. provides a “quantitative examination of gender-based mass shootings in 
America from 1966-2018,”50 that aims to create a stand-alone phenomenon for violent 
misogynistic active shooters, but only considers them mass shooters overall. They divide the 
relative grievances of their cases into four categories of perpetrator motivations – specific 
woman-targeted, specific woman-not targeted, general women-targeted, and general women-not 
targeted – and provide “implications for gender and mass shooting scholars, as well as 
practitioners developing strategies for intervention and prevention.”51 Ultimately, the study 
produces the first gender-based mass shooting typology of its kind, and provides a 
comprehensive quantitative analysis of the overarching phenomenon. Nevertheless, with a 
primary research goal of laying a new foundation for gender-based violence and a gender-based 
mass shooting typology, Silva et al. still failed to address two critical concerns relevant for a 
solid conceptual framework for this phenomenon. First, Silva et al. did not address or provide 
any distinguishable criteria between a gender-based general mass shooter and a gender-based 
                                               
50 Silva et al., “Gender-Based Mass Shootings,” 1.  
51 Silva et al., “Gender-Based Mass Shootings,” 3.   
23 
terrorist. Second, Silva considered gathering data between the timeframe of the Texas Sniper in 
1966 to the Columbine Shooting in 1999 as “more difficult to identify”52 than more recent 
events, thus leaving a noticeable gap in the literature that hopefully future research can cover.     
Even with those limitations, Silva et al. lay necessary groundwork for the current study. 
Their researchers begin by addressing a major issue aligned with this study’s focus, that “mass 
shooting studies often overlook attacks motivated by grievances against women.”53 Silva et al. 
acknowledge that while a few other mass shooting studies considering gender-based violence 
(GBV) exist, they fall short for one of two reasons; they either “only include [GBV] as a 
tangential aspect of the study,”54 or they fail to include enough case studies to be considered a 
significant contribution to the field, which is reflective of a larger pattern in the field of security 
studies regarding this topic. Silva et al. also identified a complete lack in comparative studies 
between gender-based mass shootings and all other mass shootings. Thus, the primary intent of 
their work is to provide important insight for intervention and prevention-developing strategies.55 
One of the report’s most significant findings states that from 1966 to 2018, 
There were 106 gender-based mass shooters over the entire time-period, making 
up 34% of all mass shooting attackers. There is a growth in gender-based 
shootings over the analyzed time period, with three shooters in the 1960s, four 
shooters in the 1970s, six shooters in the 1980s, 21 shooters in the 1990s, 24 
shooters in the 2000s, and 48 shooters in the first 9 years of the 2010s. In other 
words, the past 9 years examined in this study have experienced an almost equal 
number of gender-based shootings (45%) as the preceding decades combined. 
This growth in gender-based shooters coincides with an overall rise in general 
mass shooting attacks and underscores the need for research investigating the 
phenomenon.56 
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While there may have been limitations in gathering the 106 cases, the contributions and analysis 
provided by Silva et al. should be used as supporting evidence for future research – but should 
not be considered a complete conceptual framework, as the scholars had explicitly intended. This 
analysis provides that framework. 
  Lastly, while data is not included in the analysis, a thoughtful framework focused on 
Western gender-based violence is found in Canada’s April 2020 Security Intelligence Service 
Report. This report creates a space for gender-based violent extremism as part of the main 
violent extremist ideologies identified by a national governing body. In Canada’s case, violent 
extremism is broken into three overarching categories: Religiously Motivated Violent Extremism 
(RMVE), Politically Motivated Violent Extremism (PMVE), and Ideologically Motivated 
Violent Extremism (IMVE) – which is home to acts of “gender-driven violence”57 among other 
violent extremist ideologies. Unlike the United States, the Canadian Government has explicitly 
acknowledged that:  
Given the diverse combination of motivations and personalized worldviews of 
recent mass-casualty attackers, the use of such terms as “right-wing” and “left-
wing” is not only subjective, but inaccurate in describing the complexity of 
motivations of IMVE attacks in Canada and abroad.58  
 
IMVE covers four categories of violent acts: (1) Xenophobic Violence: racially-
motivated and ethno-Nationalist violence; (2) Anti-Authority Violence: anti-Government/law 
enforcement and anarchist violence; (3) Gender-Driven Violence: Violent misogyny (including 
incel) and anti-LGBTQ violence; and (4) Other Grievance-Driven and Ideologically Motivated 
Violence: acts without a “clear affiliation to an organized group or external guidance” but 
“nevertheless shaped by the echo chambers of online hate that normalize and advocate 
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violence.”59 This study seeks to caution future research from fully adopting this Canadian 
framework, because while proper steps have begun to be taken in regard to addressing gender-
driven violence as a stand-alone category, they still include a relatively miscellaneous fourth 
category within IMVE, and allow two, arguably very different ideologies inside of the gender-
driven violence category. In order to properly identify, combat, and prevent future FEM-V 
events, stakeholders must leave little grey area when assessing this phenomenon. 
Crying Wolf: The Serial Killer Craze 
The serial killer phenomenon is just that – a trend that beggars the imagination. Why 
would a human being choose – or indulge in – killing other human beings? Furthermore, why 
would humans taking pleasure in killing other humans lead to the general public’s infatuation 
with these violent acts? Much of this enticement stems from media coverage that a vast majority 
of the public consumes eagerly. Take, for example, the widely successful TV programs Dexter, 
Forensic Files, Mindhunter, and the like, which have grossed millions of dollars and continue to 
spawn spinoffs and remakes. 
Stripping away the Hollywood and media lenses, a population that is primarily white and 
male has been observed hunting other human beings – primarily vulnerable, unassuming 
females. As stated by Kevin Haggerty, “whereas in pre-modern societies killing sequentially 
might have been something that someone did, today a serial killer is something that someone can 
be.”60 The serial killer who not only targets women, but seeks personal fame and glory from their 
hunting sprees, is the type of actor that this section will address.     
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As stated by Haggerty, “serial killers are distinctively modern.”61 However, current 
tactics aimed at profiling, tracing, and combating these actors are consistently weak. Richard 
Tithecott concisely identifies the problem in contemplating serial killers as the following:    
An unthinking distinction is made between the individual and the social context, 
and the latter fades from view . . . We might think social groups, but we see 
individuals . . . Figured as acultural, isolated from a cultural context, the serial 
killer is the spectacle whose brilliance dazzles us. Focused on him, we fail to see 
beyond.62 
  
In agreement with both Haggerty and Tithecott’s analyses, stakeholders in the field have adopted 
an actor-centric view and approach to this phenomenon, thus missing crucial elements that not 
only make patterns more apparent within the “serial killer” category, but also reveal an 
overlapping phenomenon occurring outside of this romanticized criminal. 
To fit the serial killer criteria, Haggerty provides an overview of essential qualities of a 
serial killer that have been relatively agreed upon by criminology scholars. The consensual 
criteria is as follows: a serial killer is someone who has killed a minimum of three people, all of 
whom were previously unfamiliar to the killer, and the killer must experience a “cooling off’ 
period between each murder.63 Haggerty takes issue with these criteria, because within the given 
lines, dictators ordering “a procession of murders,” as well as “pirates who repeatedly murder 
captured crews, and soldiers who kill surrendered enemy combatants, operate death camps or 
oversee forced death marches”64 could also be considered “serial killers.” Haggerty asserts that 
the definition excludes “attributes of serial killing which, although not inevitably present in every 
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instance, are familiar attributes of this form of murder,”65 such as recurrent patterns made 
apparent to the most naked of eyes. 
There are four points of distinction that separate a serial killer from other murderers. The 
first factor is the focal point of serial killer characteristics: social anonymity. As stated by 
Haggerty, “a defining attribute of serial killers is that they prey on strangers.”66 In fact, before 
the term “serial killer” was popularized in the 1970s, police labeled these events “stranger 
killings.”67 This particular characteristic of serial killers is highly unique, since, aside from 
killings for hire, “the vast majority of homicides involve a prior relationship between the killers 
and their victim.”68 
A second characteristic is the rationalization frequently favored by these killers. 
According to Haggerty, “serial killers reproduce this rationalist framework and push its 
distinctive form of value-free means/ends rationality to its most fantastic extreme,”69 and this 
shows itself in various ways. First, while the majority of murders are impulsive, serial killings 
are planned killings. However, “even within the realm of planned murder, serial killing is unique 
because, from the killer’s perspective, the rational strategizing about the murder can be one of 
the most integral and pleasurable aspects of the killing itself.”70 This includes but is not limited 
to plots of abduction, torture, and the various stages of interacting with the victim’s body – “all 
of which can be part of a highly sexualized fantasy of absolute control repeatedly played out in 
the killer’s mind.”71 Therefore, rationality is not only a focal point for the level of “success” in 
these killings, but rationality can feed into the pleasure the killer experiences when carrying out 
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an act. In this realm, victims are a means to an end that serial killers feel compelled to achieve, 
and as stated by Haggerty, these victims are “typically a means to fulfill a psychic desire for 
control and self-aggrandization.”72 Studies have shown that there is also a level of 
dehumanization from the perspective of a serial killer and their victim or victims, as shown with 
their tendencies to “characterize their victims as vermin, insects or as a plague on society.”73 
This “plague on society” mindset is shared in the manosphere section of this literature review. 
The third distinction pertains to the demographics of the victims: approximately 60 
percent of the victims of serial killers are female.74 This clear preference can be attributed to 
what can be considered a distinctively modern phenomenon: a “greater historical presence of 
women in the public sphere.”75 Put bluntly, Haggerty states that “if we assume that a subset of 
men have always harbored a latent desire to kill women,” and this is not just an assumption, but 
more on that to follow in the manifestation section, “there were greater opportunities to act upon 
this drive as women became more accessible for such predation.”76 FEM-V is a foundational 
ideology that is not mutually exclusive from any other extremist ideology. Therefore, while 
individuals that target females may have outlying motivations as well, it is critical to identify the 
origin of societal grievances that can catalyze these particular men to act through violence.  
The fourth and final distinction is the frenzy. As stated by Haggerty, “serial killing is 
predominantly a media event . . . few other topics have been so persistently exploited over the 
past quarter century.”77 Without the mass media, the general public would not have the same 
opportunities to be drawn to this phenomenon. Serial killers are a key reason true crime and 
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detective novelists, comic artists, directors, and producers have audiences.78 One serial killer in 
particular, David Berkowitz, is the reason that the New York Post still exists today, and, 
ironically, crime film that inspired him to begin his hunting sprees.79  
Crying Wolf: The Manosphere  
Another category critical to this literature review that will be incorporated into the FEM-
V criteria is violent misogyny – what it is, where it comes from, and what it looks like. Violent 
misogyny is one of the most important concepts not only to the FEM-V phenomenon, but also to 
the gap that drives this research. Few scholars have examined active ideological shooters through 
a gender-based lens – and those who attempted to do so only captured a percentage of the 
problem. In contrast, this thesis provides a gendered analysis, and establishes a much-needed 
conceptual framework with which to approach the problem. The focal point of this framework is 
misogyny, and the literary review to follow will explain the evolution of misogyny, and how this 
ideology can fester and warp individuals into FEM-V shooters. It must be noted that under the 
FEM-V umbrella, forms of domestic violence and intimate partner violence (IPV), while still 
prevalent, are considered gendered hate crimes, and will not be considered. FEM-V adheres to 
actors committing mass and serial attacks motivated by a general hatred for the female gender, 
whose acts should be considered under the legal framework for terrorism. 
Buiten defines misogyny as “a strong prejudice against women”80 capable of denoting a 
“discourse or ideology that legitimizes and maintains women’s subordination.”81 Misogyny can 
be subtle, and many women’s and gender studies scholars argue82 that misogyny was the first 
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discriminatory ideology of the human race. Two early examples of this ideology are seen 
through works from Aristotle and Aquinas. Aristotle states that “the female is a female by virtue 
of a certain lack of qualities, we should regard the female nature as afflicted with a natural 
defectiveness,”83 and, according to Aquinas, “woman” was translated as “imperfect man,” or an 
“incidental being.”84 Furthermore, in the early civilizations, men asserted power over women, 
shaping a society that explicitly placed males above females. Nevertheless, the misogyny that 
has surfaced since “second-wave feminism” in the 1960s – when divorce rates and women in the 
workforce both reached unprecedented heights – has become much more overt. 
According to Anne-Marie Ambert in her 1985 sociological piece “The Effect of Divorce 
on Women’s Attitude Towards Feminism,” “women are freer sexually than they used to be, have 
access to birth control, have fewer children, and are better educated; above all, women more 
often tend to be employed and are relatively less dependent on men economically than in the 
past.”85  By the numbers alone, this period gave way to a 35% increase in women in the labor 
force between 1950 and 1960 – rising from 16.5 million in 1950 to almost 22.5 million in 1960, 
according to the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) at that time.86 Furthermore, the DOL noted 
that there was an additional increase in women working “outside the home; the number of 
women workers advanced from 29 percent of all women in 1950 to 34 percent in 1960,” making 
women’s representation in the workforce rise from 27% of all workers in 1950 to 32% in 1960.87 
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Lastly, working wives made up 55% of all women workers in 1960, as compared to 47% in 
1950, and women’s wages from all sources increased by 32% between 1949 and 1959.88 
In order to look forward, we must first reflect on the origins of the so-called 
“manosphere,” where violent misogyny roams rampant in 2021. The current manosphere is an 
online conglomeration of divergent misogynistic ideologies espoused and shared by groups or 
individuals.89 It began as an anti-feminist movement supported by men and women fighting 
against society’s gendered expectations beginning in the 1960s, and has spun into an anti-female 
web of hate that has many different sentiments across a spectrum of FEM-V extremes that 
encompasses the following groups and ideologies therein.  
The roots of this phenomenon can be traced back to the 1960s and 1970s, in the 
movement known as the “Men’s Liberation Movement,” which aimed to criticize the traditional 
gender roles of men set by society, claiming that the mold men were placed into was 
oppressive.90 As the second decade of this wave began, one particular manifestation of the 
movement took form, blaming feminism and women’s empowerment rather than society as a 
whole, for men’s oppression. Thus, entered the Men’s Rights Activists (MRAs), who focused on 
issues such as men’s places in the military as it pertained to conscriptions, divorce, and custody 
laws. According to Ribeiro et al., this new movement and its associated ideology brought forth a 
tone of anger, rather than empathy, towards women’s liberation movements. MRAs believed that 
these female-centric movements inflicted on men “the worst of both worlds.”91 Interestingly, 
important figures of manosphere movements such as Warren Farrell used to be leaders within 
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subgroups associated with second-wave feminist movements. Farrell himself had led a men’s 
group within the National Organization for Women, only to then write “The Myth of Male 
Power” in 1993, which, according to Ribeiro et al., “became a fundamental text to Men’s Rights 
Activists, claiming that men, and not women, are systematically disadvantaged in society.”92 
Violence against women has various forms, such as:  
intimate partner violence; sexual abuse by non-intimate partners; trafficking, 
forced prostitution, exploitation of labor, and debt bondage of women and girls; 
physical and sexual violence against prostitutes; sex-selective abortion, female 
infanticide, the deliberate neglect of girls; and rape in war.93  
 
Watts and Zimmerman in their study reveal that just within a twenty-year span from 1980-2000, 
“the evidence of the extent of violence perpetrated against women has increased and is beginning 
to offer a global overview of the magnitude of this abuse.”94  
Silva et al. provides an overview of a more specific type of misogyny, known as 
“hegemonic masculinity.” This form of masculinity refers to the societal norm or expectation of 
men’s role over women, which is “often performative and carried out through the socialized and 
institutionalized subordination of women and marginalized male identities.”95 For those within 
this category, they often feel that their sense of manhood is being challenged by society, and thus 
that they have failed to achieve an idealized male identity, making them feel a sense of so-called 
“crisis of masculinity.”96 As with many entering crisis mode, men who fall under the category of 
hegemonic masculinity undergo a sense of urgency regarding their manhood. That has been 
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known to lead them to take “corrective action” in the form of one of the violence-against-women 
methods mentioned above, in order to attain and reinforce their supposed status.97 
Crying Wolf: The Misogynistic Manifestations 
In recent years, internet-based misogynistic communities have become the favored spaces 
to share and participate in overtly violent misogynistic beliefs. These communities – including, 
but not limited to incels – encompass groups such as the aforementioned MRAs, but additionally 
Pickup Artists (PUAs), Men Going Their Own Way (MGTOW), and the incels. This section will 
provide an overview of these movements to give further insight into how violent misogyny 
manifests itself today, but these movements are not the only forms of VAW manifestations. This 
is primarily to demonstrate that there are indeed movements other than the incel movement that 
require monitoring.  
The main idea behind MRAs is seeking justice for what are perceived as discriminatory 
and gendered molds and expectations that society has placed on men. As with other extremist 
ideologies and movements, MRAs gradually became more polarized and extreme in their belief 
system, and are considered to be “misogynistic and/or hateful.”98  
Pickup Artists (PUAs) are a community that attempts to gamify interactions and 
relationships with women. This “game” consists of building and honing “techniques, strategies, 
and mindsets that help men pick up women,” thus resulting in the objectification and harassment 
of women targeted. According to Ribeiro et al., PUAs conceptualize the “masculinity crisis in 
terms of the feminization of the man, ‘a fool at the hands of women.’”99 Though Ribeiro et al. 
claims that this group has diminished in online and in-person prominence, a 2015 news article 
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published by the Citizen Times reported threatening rape culture found within the PUA 
community, such as postings like, “Nothing like waking up with a cutie, cuddling, then wailing 
on her with a belt … Push/pull. #dating advice.”100 As recently as September 2018, BuzzFeed 
News was reporting about PUAs as well, with headlines like “Pickup Artists Are Still A Thing. 
And They Want You To Know They’ve Evolved.”101 
Men Going Their Own Way (MGTOW) shares the belief with MRAs especially that 
society is “rigged against men,”102 having been known to “espouse the abandonment of women 
and sometimes, of Western society.”103 They argue there is no choice in a broken system but to 
simply go their own way. Their sentiments reflect extreme anti-feminism and misogyny. What 
officially distinguishes MRAs from MGTOWs is that “while MRAs want to change politics and 
the rule of law, MGTOWs advocate abstaining from relationships with women.”104 
Lastly, the incel community, arguably best known for being associated with mass 
murders since Elliot Rodger’s shooting spree in 2014. The general viewpoint inside of the incel 
community is two-fold: “their understanding of society as a hierarchy where one’s place is 
determined mostly by physical characteristics, and their identification of women as the primary 
culprit for this hierarchy.”105 This so-called hierarchy includes the top tier of “Chads” and 
“Stacys,” the idealized men and women of society; the middle tier of “normies” whose category 
should be self-explanatory; and the bottom tier which is, of course, the incels. According to 
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Hoffman’s assessment of incel lore, the incels interpret this hierarchy as consisting of “a small 
number of Chads attract[ing] the majority of women, leaving the apparently unattractive women 
for the normies, and none for the incels.”106 This totem-pole effect leads to a second core belief 
of the incels, that, 
Women are intrinsically shallow and make dating decisions based largely on 
physical attractiveness, height, weight, and race. Women are thus reflexively 
drawn to men with the “right” features, the incel ideology maintains, regardless of 
personality or integrity. And, they are therefore repulsed by men who do not 
conform to this image – even if they are the “supreme gentlemen” described by 
Elliot Rodger, who perpetrated the first attack claimed in the name of incels.107 
Furthermore, incels believe that due to women’s superficial selectivity, the female gender created 
the “unbalanced, exclusive dating pool, to which incels will never gain access,”108 and are 
therefore the sole perpetrators of incels’ “isolation and rejection,”109 making women the 
“primary targets of incels’ anger and violence.”110  
Hoffman et al. notes that “in recent years, increasingly serious incidents of violence have 
been committed by young men predominantly in the United States and Canada who self-identify 
as incels (involuntary celibates).”111 This term was first used in 1997, when a woman named 
Alana (last name anonymous), an undergraduate at Canada’s Carleton University, set out to 
create an online platform that “aimed to give individuals an outlet for expressing their 
frustrations over sexuality and dating; but more than that, to provide support and rehabilitation 
for romantically alienated individuals.”112 She named the website “Alana’s Involuntary Celibacy 
Project,” and, at the time of the site’s creation, “women and men alike were invited to join the 
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online community of involuntary celibates  – an ‘involuntary celibate’ was simply one who had 
not had sex for some time, despite trying.”113 Fast forward six short years, platforms like 4chan 
and Reddit surfaced on the Internet, and “encouraged extremist declamations in order to gain 
more visibility.”114  
Within the last decade, traces of Alana’s intended incel forum still existed online, in the 
form of the website IncelSupport, but these efforts were quickly overshadowed by those who 
were becoming “increasingly militant and hostile to women, expressing offensive biologically 
deterministic memes and openly advocating violence.”115 Those whose violent misogynistic 
colors were beginning to show migrated to another site, LoveShy, where “rhetoric and 
messaging grew increasingly strident, and, as one account of the incel movement recalled, ‘tilted 
overwhelmingly male; one of its administrators openly praised mass killers and encouraged 
another forum member to commit murder.’”116  
Older communities such as MRAs and Pick Up Artists have ultimately been 
overshadowed by new communities like MGTOW, and incels, according to Ribeiro et al.’s 
findings. Moreover, most online users in this realm are found to be active across several online 
manosphere communities, with a significantly higher concentration of users migrating from the 
old to the new, and with newer communities additionally brings higher levels of toxicity and 
misogyny, which Ribeiro notes could be a trend projection for the manosphere as a whole. 
Future research should explore fringe fluidity across these communities and establish spectrums 
of violence across the communities as well in greater detail.  
Crying Wolf: The Domestic Terrorists 
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Movements and ideologies, such as Salafi extremism, have been permanently branded by 
the media, scholars, law enforcement, and other stakeholders alike as terrorism. As policymakers 
attempt to map the new terrain of “domestic terrorism” and “domestic violent extremism” in the 
wake of the January 6, 2021 insurrection at the U.S. Capitol, this analysis seeks ensure that the 
analysis is fully robust.  
 As of early 2021, Silva et al. established that more mass shootings occur in the U.S. than 
any other country in the world.117 More specifically, the incidence rates of these mass shootings 
have quadrupled over time between the 1970s and the 2010s; mass shootings occurred 
approximately every 608 days in the 1970s, but by the 2010s, the United States was seeing a 
mass shooting almost every 20 days.118 Whether or not Silva et al.’s numbers were skewed based 
on anti-gun bias is not relevant to this study. The question that needs to be focused on here is 
why do mass shootings happen at all? According to Silva et al., mass shootings have historically 
stemmed from “the corrosion of idealized masculinity,”119 and two major waves of mass murder 
in 20th century America attest to this claim.  
Silva et al. argues that both of these waves “coincided with macro-level forces that 
eroded the male dominant paradigm,” with the first taking place in the 1920s and 1930s and 
consisting primarily of familicides, or “attacks in which the victims were family members, with 
incidents largely occurring inside a private residence or sparsely populated location.”120 Silva et 
al. cites Duwe’s linkage between the rise in mass murder, economic hardship, and  “an inability 
to achieve culturally expected gender norms”121 through the example of male farmers and their 
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families during the Great Depression. These farmers, devastated and ashamed by the effects of 
the Depression on their lands, and left unable to provide for their families, murdered their entire 
families before committing suicide to “avoid starvation and embarrassment.”122  
The second wave occurred in the 1960s, as previously mentioned, when divorce rates 
reached unprecedented heights, as did the number of women in the workforce. According to 
Silva et al., “such shifts signified a challenge to culturally prescribed norms of male dominance 
and female dependence,”123 which led to “an increase in the targeting of random individuals in 
public locations, marking the introduction of mass public shootings.”124 
Returning to current-day events, an examination of terrorist plots and attacks on U.S. soil 
in 2020 captured that “white supremacists and other like-minded extremists”125 were responsible 
for two-thirds of the attacks, and twenty-percent were attributed to “anarchists, anti-fascists, and 
other like-minded extremists,”126 according to data gathered by the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies. 
According to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s October 2020 Homeland 
Threat Assessment, “racially and ethnically motivated violent extremists – specifically white 
supremacist extremists (WSEs) – will remain the most persistent and lethal threat in the 
Homeland.”127 This should be a red flag. 
The report also assessed that anarchists and other individuals inspired by anti-government 
and anti-authority ideologies posed a threat, without providing any actual data to back its claims. 
Similarly, the Federal Bureau of Investigation argued that the “top threat we face from domestic 
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violent extremists is from racially- and ethnically-motivated violent extremists, including white 
supremacists.”128 The FBI’s claims are also not supported by open-sourced data. Jones et al. 
sought to fill in the gaps left by DHS and FBI, and their findings were significant. For example, 
“white supremacists and other like-minded extremists conducted 67 percent of terrorist plots and 
attacks in the United States in 2020,”129 and “there was a rise in the number of anarchist, anti-
fascist, and other like-minded attacks and plots in 2020 compared to previous years, which 
comprised 20 percent of terrorist incidents (an increase from 8 percent in 2019).”130 However, 
Jones et al. failed to note the specific targeting of women, which has also risen throughout 2020. 
Jones et al. did not explicitly cover gender-based violence in their summary, because they 
considered this violence part of far-right terrorism, rather than a standalone threat. Thus, the 
only gender-based threat language included in their analysis was in a single paragraph on criteria 
for extremism under a “far-right” umbrella: 
Far-right terrorism refers to the use or threat of violence by subnational or non-
state entities whose goals may include racial or ethnic supremacy; opposition to 
government authority; anger at women, including from the involuntary celibate 
(or “incel”) movement; belief in certain conspiracy theories, such as QAnon; and 
outrage against certain policies, such as abortion.131  
This is a dangerous mis-categorization of not only a FEM-V movement, but of any 
“anger at women” individuals or movements to come. Members of the FEM-V phenomenon 
share a non-partisan ideology fueled by their hatred for women, and their collective feeling of 
being robbed by society, and therefore their belief that they deserve personal glory. Due to this 
mis-categorization, the data that follows in Jones et al.’s assessment in regard to “far-right” 
targets, attacks, and plots from January to August of 2020 cannot be taken at face value (see 
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Figure 1). It is imperative that this oversight be corrected; FEM-V actors must be singled out and 
assessed for their unified ideology, not allowed to disappear into vague categories. 
 
Figure 1: Targets of Violent Far-right Attacks and Plots, January - August 2020132 
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Chapter Three: The Boys Who Cry 
 
Despite the reigning cliché, fiction about serial killers constitutes anything but 
“escapist entertainment” . . . these texts frequently mirror actual crimes, 
suggesting that the border between representation and reality is more porous than 
conventional thought allows.  
– Jane Caputi, Professor of Women’s and Gender Studies, 1993133 
 
The following chapter provides an analysis of the four cases of David Berkowitz, or the 
Son of Sam, Marc Lépine, or the Montreal Shooter, Elliot Rodger, or the incel shooter, and 
David Kaufman – a man who was arrested before the world could ever really know him for 
another name.   
David Berkowitz  
Caputi considers the contemporary era the “age of sex crime,” wrought with rising counts 
of serial sex murder “and the ascendancy of the serial killer to mythic heroic status.”134 
Beginning in late nineteenth century London with Jack the Ripper – the so-called “founding 
father”135 of the age according to Caputi – the criteria for a crime to be considered a “sexual act” 
began to transform and evolve. Ripper in particular was responsible for the murder and 
mutilation of five female prostitutes, but in the initial wake of his murders, his acts of violence 
had not been identified as “sex crimes,” because he did not rape his victims. However, it would 
eventually surface that the “assaulting weapon was understood as a phallus and the murder and 
mutilation of a female body were comprehended to be the ‘equivalents of the sexual act.’”136 
Enter David Berkowitz, another non-rapist sex criminal.    
Lawrence Klausner’s “Son of Sam: Based on the Authorized Transcription of the Tapes, 
Official Documents, and Diaries of David Berkowitz” captures the chronological life and impact 
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of New York’s infamous Son of Sam, otherwise known as David Berkowitz. Klausner consists 
of interviews and taped interviews of nearly 300 individuals from relevant stakeholder 
communities related to Berkowitz’s crimes, “including the families of victims and the surviving 
victims, policemen, politicians, attorneys, psychiatrists, and newspapermen.”137 For these 
reasons, Klausner’s book is the primary source for this section, and the centerpiece for the 
analysis of David Berkowitz.  
Born “Richard Falco” but known only to the world when he became David Berkowitz, 
this man “was a nobody who became somebody by killing people.”138 Before his rise to fame, 
Berkowitz lived a relatively bland life. He wasn’t a well-liked kid, but he didn’t inspire fear, 
either. His guardians were foster parents, but they were good people. He was a decent athlete, but 
never had a cheerleader girlfriend on his arm – or any girlfriend at all, for that matter. He loved 
crime shows and movies. He wanted to serve his country and fight in a war. He tried 
transitioning to civilian life when he returned, but could only find work as a night security guard 
– a position considered to be lowest on the law enforcement totem pole. He also had hobbies, 
just like everyone else, but unlike most, his favorite hobby was “hunting”139 women. Young 
women. His first-ever hunting spree involved a knife as the weapon of choice, inspired by his 
favorite crime films. Unlike the movies, however, his first victim stunned him by screaming and 
running away.140 His first attempt left Berkowitz empty-handed, so he upgraded his weapon of 
choice to a .44 caliber bulldog revolver, and then he became famous.  
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As a child forced into the foster care system at age four, Berkowitz was brought up 
seeking acceptance and a sense of community. He also sought out different ideologies as they 
suited the respective chapters in his life, exploring both Judaism and Christianity in his 
adolescent to young adult years. More specifically, Berkowitz was born into Judaism, and 
converted to Baptist because of his interest in the ceremony of baptism. He wanted to be in the 
spotlight, he wanted to be accepted by others, and he wanted a community of support. The major 
issue with these wants was that he was not a true believer of either religion, and when he sensed 
that his moment of fame fleeting, he continued on his search for belonging; what he found next 
would not only bring him a sense of community, but worldwide fame. 
 Berkowitz was “an ultimately anonymous man . . . few knew he was alive . . . fewer 
cared.”141 Klausner describes him as “a drab, soft-faced man . . . not very good at studies or at 
friendships and . . . is a virgin to this day.”142 While his actual sexual history is purely hearsay, it 
has been scientifically proven that Berkowitz lied about contracting gonorrhea while in Vietnam 
from having sex with a prostitute,143 and various experts consider him to be a pathological liar. 
Berkowitz has been known to boast of false achievements, such as sexual conquests. Klausner 
stated that Berkowitz “wanted to be good-looking, popular, successful, romantic, and loved by 
young women,” but that “he was none of these, except in his fantasies,”144 with the only source 
of real-life pleasure stemming from masturbation.   
It is no secret that Berkowitz was sexually frustrated, and it is therefore no surprise that 
he specifically targeted young women on his hunting sprees. In fact, hindsight that followed from 
catching and imprisoning David Berkowitz revealed that before his first successful murder, he 
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had accosted a fifty-year-old widow named Mrs. Davis, mistaking her appearance for a younger 
woman in his targeted demographic. Apparently after coming face-to-face with Mrs. Davis and 
realizing her age, he retreated to his car.145 In the words of Klausner, “if he could not conquer 
young women by seducing them, he could conquer them with the act of murder.”146  
He only acquired blue collar jobs in his life outside of the military, but found uniforms 
symbolizing power wherever he could. After returning from Vietnam, he began work as a night 
security guard. According to Klausner, this was due to Berkowitz’s preference to be in uniform, 
given the “sense of authority a uniform imparts.”147 
His modus operandi involved targeting so-called “lover's lanes,” and he began to have 
success with his murders beginning on his second hunting spree. Berkowitz’s first murder victim 
would come to be considered his “little princess.”148 Her name was Donna Lauria, she was 18 
years old, and she was shot to death at 1:00am on July 29, 1976. Three months later, on October 
23, Rosemary Keenan and Carl Denaro were caught in Berkowitz’s crosshairs, but not fatally. 
On this instance, Berkowitz waited for the newspapers to highlight his hit the next morning, and 
while there was some mention of a man – Carl Denaro – sustaining a gunshot wound, Berkowitz 
recalls that he was taken aback “that the papers gave greater play to accounts of the final debate 
between Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford.”149  
Eventually a task force, The Omega Task Force, was created within the NYPD to catch 
the serial murderer terrorizing the streets of New York City. Upon assembly, Berkowitz was 
recorded stating, 
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I read about this group they had started to get me. It was in the papers and on 
television. I remember [officers] Borrelli and Dowd. I followed them from that 
day on. Whenever anything was written about them, I read it. I also listened to the 
radio when it came up. I knew that they'd get me some day. The only question 
was how . . . and when.150 
From then until April 17, 1977, Berkowitz began clipping the stories and saving them, following 
newspaper accounts, and piecing together personnel associated with the task force set up to take 
him down. On April 17, however, Berkowitz would attack again – this time, leaving a four-page 
letter151 addressed to Captain Joseph Borrelli, supervisor of the Omega Task Force. Before this 
attack, Berkowitz’s crimes were framed as acts committed by the “.44-Caliber Killer,” a phrase 
coined by the media. In the letter left to Borrelli at the crime scene – just ten feet from the 
victims’ car – Berkowitz would take control of the narrative. His name would be Son of Sam.152 
The letter declared that David Berkowitz “was a man against an entire city,”153 in the words of 
Captain Borrelli, and was printed, rather than hand-written, because Berkowitz thought the print 
version made his words appear more “ghoulish-looking.”154 The victims’ names were Valentina 
Suriani and Alexander Esau.  
Before David Berkowitz, staples in national media today like the Daily News and the 
New York Post were on the brink of extinction. According to Klausner,  
The morning Daily News and the afternoon New York Post, were struggling for 
circulation among those people who did not choose to read The New York Times. 
The News had been losing readers for a decade. The Post was under the new 
stewardship of the Australian press adventurer Rupert Murdoch. . .A fire of fright 
was burning; they fanned it.155 
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Because of David Berkowitz, television ratings soared. Newspapers flew off of the stands. The 
day after David Berkowitz was captured, the Daily News sold 2.2 million copies – 350,000 more 
than usual. The New York Post, which headlined “CAPTURED” in red ink, jumped from its 
typical circulation of 607,000 newspapers to one million over night.156  
While Berkowitz’s crimes were committed before the age of the Internet and online 
forums, his letters were quite revealing. In November of 1975, Berkowitz wrote to his father, 
Dear Dad, 
 
It's cold and gloomy here in New York, but that's okay because the weather fits 
my mood – gloomy. Dad, the world is getting dark now. I can feel it more and 
more. The people, they are developing a hatred for me. You wouldn't believe how 
much some people hate me. Many of them want to kill me. I don't even know 
these people, but they still hate me. Most of them are young. I walk down the 
street and they spit and kick at me. The girls call me ugly and they bother me the 
most. The guys just laugh. Anyhow, things will soon change for the better.157 
  
Before his capture, Berkowitz was planning his greatest attack yet. According to the 
direct source, this attack, which he considered “the final assignment,”158 was going to involve 
killing “as many as [he] could, as quickly as possible.”159 Suffolk County police estimate that a 
minimum of twenty dead, and an equal number of severely injured, were likely to have been 
victims of Berkowitz’s final assignment, if it had ever come to fruition.160 In fact, Berkowitz 
claims that the only reason he did not go through with it was because of the poor weather: “If it's 
raining, then there is nobody on the streets. What are you going to do?”161  
When he was captured, it was noted by Omega personnel that, “the guy just turned 
around and smiled at us. He had that stupid smile on his face, like it was all a kid's game.”162  
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It is worth taking a moment to consider how differently David Berkowitz would have 
been categorized by the mass media, law enforcement, and crime novelists and filmmakers alike 
if the sun had shone instead of shied away on that day. If his crimes fueled by hatred for women 
had shifted into an active shooting event as his final act, the case of David Berkowitz could have 
potentially driven stakeholders in this community to begin conversations regarding gender-based 
violence and active ideological shooters much earlier, but hindsight is cruel. During his thirteen-
month murder spree and terroristic tirade, David Berkowitz coined such phrases for himself as 
“The Wicked King Wicker,” “The Chubby Monster,” and “The Duke of Death,”163 before 
settling on Son of Sam. As one of two cases considered under the FEM-V phenomenon, this use 
of self-proclaimed titles makes Elliot Rodger’s self-proclamation as the “Supreme Gentleman” 
both predictable and haunting.  
Marc Lépine  
“I have decided to send the feminists, who have always ruined my life, to their Maker.”164 
These translated words taken from a 3-page manifesto belong to the Montreal Shooter, Marc 
Lépine – a 25-year-old who murdered fourteen female engineer students before killing himself 
on December 6, 1989. There are several reasons Lépine’s case study is included in this thesis. 
First, he is a prime example of how violent misogyny is not only a global ideology, but also how 
violent misogyny can be a call to action that certain individuals answer with extreme violence. 
Second, “the Montreal Massacre received media attention across North America and the 
world,”165 which gave Lépine notoriety as reportedly “the worst mass murderer in Canada in 
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modern times.”166 He earned this title targeting one type of group in mind: “feminists.” As 
translated from his French manifesto, a feminist was any career-oriented woman who lived 
outside of the traditional stereotypical roles expected of Canadian women in 1989. Third, Lépine, 
like Berkowitz, was explicitly labeled a serial killer – a second non-rapist serial killer whose 
primary target was young women. 
 “You’re all a bunch of feminists . . . and I hate feminists,”167 Lépine shouted as he 
separated the male engineer students from the female in a L’École Polytechnique de Montréal 
classroom. Marc Lépine then let the men leave and opened fire on the remaining students, killing 
six women in the classroom and finding his remaining eight victims in the hallway. He would 
injure 10 additional women and 4 men before inflicting a fatal gunshot on himself.168 The 
victims’ ages ranged from 21 to 31.  
While Canada has recently produced their “CSIS Public Report 2019,” denouncing 
gender-driven violence, nothing of the sort existed in Lépine’s era. One of the largest 
connections to these crimes is the violent extremist ideology that fuels these shooters, and yet 
this connection has yet to be legally or academically specified. Fourteen aspiring female 
engineers died because a man, self-depicted as a “rational erudite,”169 was rejected from the same 
engineering school and blamed this failure on “feminists.” At the time, Canada did not define his 
crimes as those affiliated with terrorism; however, Hoffman et al. managed to address Lépine’s 
actions from a FEM-V perspective.    
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In “Assessing the Threat of Incel Violence,” Bruce Hoffman and his colleagues analyzed 
both the incel movement and those who expressed incel-like societal grievances and committed 
similar acts of violence, but came before the dawn of the incel movement. Hoffman et al. 
considers these actors “ex post facto incels.” According to Hoffman et al., 
The incel community retroactively inducts past attackers, even predating Elliot 
Rodger, into a virtual pantheon of incel heroes. While many of these males could 
not have been part of online incel communities, as their actions predate the advent 
of most online forums, their violent acts nonetheless conform to the patterns of 
social isolation generally, and rejection by women specifically, that animated 
subsequent incel violence. Incels have taken these historical incidents of 
misogynist mass violence as proof that involuntary celibacy has precipitated 
violence in the past, and that such men should therefore be lauded for their 
actions.170  
Hoffman et al. explicitly identifies Marc Lépine and labels him as a prime example of an ex post 
facto incel, which is a critical piece to the FEM-V foundation. However, FEM-V is not defined 
by a particular group or movement, so while incels are included within the phenomenon, it is not 
the defining piece. FEM-V incorporates all gender-based violent actors, rather than isolating the 
miscellaneous categories of serial killer, mass murderer, incel shooter, active shooter, lone wolf, 
and the like.  
Elliot Rodger 
Elliot Rodger is arguably the most notable – and potentially predictable – case study in a 
thesis centered around violence against women and the evolution of violent misogyny in today’s 
world. While he is a significant inflection point in the FEM-V phenomenon, he should be 
considered as equally significant to the other cases included, rather than the focal point. 
Furthermore, as FEM-V does not isolate shooter typologies, Rodger should not only be 
considered an incel actor, but potentially a spree killer as well. Ultimately, his two manifestos 
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spoke of a yearning for self-glory and a need to get revenge on society for being isolated and 
oppressed as a virgin – criteria critical for the FEM-V ideology.  
On May 23, 2014 in Isla Vista, California, Rodger was 22 years old, armed and angry. 
After releasing his 141-page autobiographical manifesto titled “My Twisted World: The Story of 
Elliot Rodger,” he stabbed his two roommates and a close friend to death – a combined total of 
134 times – before beginning his shooting spree on the streets of the University of California’s 
Santa Barbara campus. He would end up injuring 14 people – 7 by gunfire and 7 others by 
striking them with his car – and would kill 3 before taking his own life.171 His motivation was a 
relentless hatred of women, and his reason was the constant rejection that led to him dying a 
virgin. A martyr immortalized by an online community through posters, pillow cases, t-shirts,172 
and most importantly incel chat rooms, Rodger’s story, provided through both written and video 
manifestos,173 has led to a lasting legacy leaving him the figurehead of a movement whose 
foundational ideology is in full alignment with FEM-V.  
While Rodger never cited direct affiliation to the incel movement in either manifesto,  
Taisto Witt stated that, “Rodger himself emerged from the online incel community,”174 and 
reports that “although the phrases ‘involuntary celibate’ or ‘incel’ appeared nowhere in his 141 
page biographical manifesto, investigations by law enforcement agencies and journalists 
revealed that he was a frequent visitor of and participant in online incel communities such as the 
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now-defunct Reddit forum ‘ForeverAlone’, as well as incel adjacent sites like PUAhate.com.”175 
Rodger personally left traces of himself throughout the forums, and thought he deserved more 
than what the world had offered him. The incels provided him an eternal celebrity platform after 
May 2014. 
According to his video manifesto,176 Elliot Rodger was out to kill women that day. 
Furthermore, as the literature review sections regarding both serial killer characteristics and 
violent misogyny make clear, the murders of his roommates and friend ahead of his massacre 
fully align with the foundational motivation for his FEM-V, anti-female act as well; there is a 
pattern present between singularly categorized murderers such as Rodger and incel, or Berkowitz 
and serial killer, that are in fact much more dynamic. His isolation and virginity led him to the 
incel online forums. Elliot sought out a community that matched his societal grievances, and was 
met with a collective plea for a leader to act. He answered the call, but not before writing an 
autobiography, recording a YouTube video, and murdering three male acquaintances.  
Elliot Rodger is a multi-faceted illustration of the FEM-V phenomenon and a member of 
a group that seeks, incites, and celebrates this type of violence. Furthermore, he not only follows 
in the shoes of the cases before him, “One day in 1963 [David Berkowitz] tried to enlist another 
boy to ‘become a member of my girl-hating club,’”177 and, similar to every line of both of 
Rodger’s manifestos, “David was far from the model youngster he'd like people to believe he 
had been,”178 and lied about virtually every achievement or event that he claimed ever took 
place, such as contracting gonorrhea or being a straight-A student. And Lépine? According to 
Caputi, “Lépine resented women’s advancement in a traditionally male profession and blamed 
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women for ‘ruining his life.’”179 Who did he aim for? The “fucking feminists,”180 and he opened 
fire on the women in what would be a half-hour rampage murdering fourteen young women, 
wounding nine other women and 4 men, then turning the gun on himself, and leaving behind a 
suicide note – also known as a manifesto, in this case – which included a hit list of nineteen other 
prominent Canadian women he couldn’t get that day.181    
Where has Rodger’s legacy led FEM-V actions on the Western stage? On April 23, 2018, 
25-year-old Alek Minassian “drove a rented van through one of the [Toronto]’s busiest streets, 
striking pedestrians and ultimately killing 10 persons, eight of whom were women.”182 Shortly 
before beginning his killing spree, he posted on Facebook a chilling message, which stated,  
Private (Recruit) Minassian Infantry 00010, wishing to speak to Sgt 4chan please. 
C23249161. The Incel Rebellion has already begun! We will overthrow all the 
Chads and Stacys! All hail the Supreme Gentleman Elliot Rodger!183  
According to Hoffman et al., “as of March 3, 2021, Minassian was officially found guilty 
of 10 counts of first-degree murder and 16 counts of attempted murder.”184 Considered to be “the 
deadliest incel terrorist attack inspired by Rodger’s example,”185 Minassian took to the streets of 
Toronto, Canada to continue Rodger’s work, and to earn himself personal glory as well, just as it 
happened for Rodger and the other FEM-V cases before him. When Minassian did not die in the 
act – a failed attempt at suicide by cop – he reveled in the fame, living to tell the tales, and has 
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even claimed “he had been in direct communication with both Elliot Rodger and Christopher 
Harper-Mercer.”186 That claim that has yet to be verified. 
David Kaufman 
This final case exemplifies the current, past, and ongoing threats that have been outlined 
in this thesis. His name is David Kaufman. As of March 2021, information involving his case 
came in the form of news reports and materials unsealed from United States v. Kaufman (7:20-
cr-00577).187 On September 9, 2020, the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) took down an 
alleged terrorist in a complaint filed in early September 2020: an incel.188 An unsealed complaint 
filed by the JTTF detailed a “year-long campaign of harassment, rape, and death threats levied at 
a Long Island couple by David Kaufman, a self-described member of the ‘incel’ movement and 
supporter of one of its most notorious murderers, Elliot Rodger.”189 
 According to prosecutors, Kaufman targeted a campaign at an old female college 
acquaintance (Victim-1) – as well as her partner (Victim-2) and their friends in October 2019, 
after years of having not crossed paths. He began this harassment over Facebook, allegedly 
falsely accusing Victim-2 of beating Victim-1. This harassment continued and spread, “in a 
series of messages on Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube in retaliation for ‘rejecting and depriving 
him of sex to which he believed he was entitled.’”190 His alleged threats used language consistent 
within the incel movement, such as referring to the victims’ high school classmates as “normies,” 
and another of his alleged victims as a “Chad,” in addition to allegedly adopting the 
“movement’s misogynist goals, telling one victim that ‘it should be illegal for a woman to say 
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no’ to sex.”191 An example comes in the form of a comment Kaufman allegedly authored, in 
response to a post by Victim-1:  
It goes to show that Chads like [Victim-2] can literally say ANYTHING and have 
everyone love them no matter what. While incels are FUCKED and have no [one] 
give a shit about them no matter how good their confidence or personality is . . . 
And yes you don't 'love [Victim-2]. You're helplessly sexually attracted to his 
Chad face. And you can't bring yourself to admit that.192 
  
According to Hughes, “Kaufman allegedly pivoted to messaging the woman on other 
social media platforms using burner accounts registered under pseudonyms like ‘Big Man,’ 
‘John Murray,’ and ‘David Khalifa.’”193 His messages consisted of “rape and death threats 
against Victim-1 and her social circle,”194 such as, “I'll have sex with a woman one day. One way 
or another [wink emoji].”195 As time went on in Kaufman’s alleged campaign, he expanded his 
reach to include friends of the Victims 1 and 2, “one of whom allegedly received a bomb threat 
from the defendant in her mailbox along with a note that said ‘I'm going to tear your skin off and 
rape your face open stupid whore!!!’”196 
If the mailbox and letter harassment sentiments are not connecting enough FEM-V dots 
for the reader, “Kaufman also allegedly made frequent references to the Second Amendment, 
purchasing firearms and ‘hunting’ in the context of his threats.”197 David Berkowitz not only 
drove to Texas to purchase his firearm, but was one of the first to refer to killing women as 
“hunting,” as well. Furthermore, Kaufman harassed Victim-2 with “pictures of murdered victims 
of Elliot Rodger.”198 And, not only did Kaufman identify Rodger as a source of inspiration 
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through his alleged media campaign, but he also mentioned Rodger as inspiration in police 
interviews. According to Hughes, “He allegedly posted a quote from Rodger’s manifesto on 
Twitter alongside Victim-1’s name. Officers from Stamford police, the New York State Police, 
and the Postal Inspection Service confronted Kaufman about his harassment of the couple and in 
one interview he allegedly told Postal Inspectors that “he was an incel and identified with Elliot 
Rodger's ideology and manifesto,”199 according to the complaint.  
Ultimately, despite the objective growth of the incel movement over the last six years – 
both online and as seen in incel-inspired attacks – these incidents are considered to be “still 
infrequent”200 when compared to other categories of attacks. However, as noted by Hughes, what 
researchers and other stakeholders should be paying attention to within the FEM-V phenomenon 
is that “perpetrators of incel terrorism tend to be more violent when they do offend.”201 
According to Bruce Hoffman when interviewed by Hughes in the Daily Beast article, “what's 
worrisome is that their per-average fatality or casualty rate is fairly high. It's on the order of 
school shootings . . . about eight persons killed in these incidents.”202 David Kaufman was 
indicted on October 26, 2020 on one count of transmitting threatening interstate 
communications, and one count of stalking.203 He is scheduled for a hearing in late March, 2021. 
Kaufman’s case being investigated by JTTF is promising to stakeholders in the FEM-V 
community, since the entity typically only focuses on cases “associated with Islamist extremist 
groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda or right-wing extremists, like neo-Nazis.”204 However, whereas 
the FBI has documented the incel movement as being known to have “committed acts of 
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violence against women across the world,”205 two things are happening with Kaufman’s case that 
are keeping this trial from being as monumental as it could be for FEM-V research. The first 
issue is that while Hughes considers Kaufman’s acts to be related to “incel terrorism,”206 
lawmakers have not shared that sentiment. A second issue is that even if this case gets the proper 
acknowledgement regarding the inclusion of incel perpetrators being considered terrorists, 
stakeholders must remember that incels are only a part of the manosphere. FEM-V seeks to fill 
those cracks and ensure that every perpetrator is seen for who they really are, what they believe, 
and what they are acting for: the FEM-V ideology.   
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Chapter Four: The Numbers 
. . . manosphere conspiracy theories ground the fall of (Western) civilization – an 
outcome of the existential threat facing the in-group – in women’s destruction of 
the natural social order through their failure to understand and accept their 
“proper” place. Feminism is posed as a tool created by a hostile force and used 
(unwittingly by ‘good’ women and intentionally by ‘bad’ women and cultural 
Marxists) to sow social chaos and convince people that impending social 
destruction is in reality progressive, positive change. 
– Ashley Mattheis, PhD, December 2019207 
 
 The following cases are of particular relevance to this study because they are 
manifestations of the extant literature. The literature has lacked cohesion across the relevant 
disciplines, making it difficult to create the proper reference tools so greatly needed by 
stakeholders seeking to combat or even, hopefully, prevent active ideological shooters. The four 
studies to follow – Capellan, Gill et al., START’s PIRUS, and Silva et al. – have all made 
significant contributions to the field, and as a result, have been the leading sources for research 
by security scholars. However, each of the studies lacks at least one critical element needed to 
bring the entire FEM-V phenomenon to a point where it can fruitfully studied.  
Beginning with Capellan, robust criteria were used and assessed in his dataset which 
should be adopted by future scholars in their active shooter research. Nevertheless, Capellan 
excluded any consideration of grievances against women in his development of categories. Thus, 
Capellan’s study of active ideological versus non-ideological shooters should be considered a 
demographic template for necessary criteria of active shooters, but future scholars should 
additionally incorporate FEM-V into their respective studies. 
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The second study to be discussed in greater detail below is “Terrorist Use of the Internet 
by the Numbers.” The authors, Gill et al., state in the limitations that their decision to focus on 
terrorists based in the U.K. was two-fold: (1) sample datasets of U.K. lone-actor terrorists were 
more readily available to the scholars, and (2) “terrorism actor dictionaries were more 
available”208 for U.K.-based actors as well. While Gill et al. are U.K.-based themselves, their 
limitations still speak to an important geographical gap in active ideological shooter datasets: 
North America. 
The third study, PIRUS, claims to provide scholars with “deidentified individual-level 
information on the backgrounds, attributes, and radicalization processes of over 2,200 violent 
and non-violent extremists who adhere to far right, far left, Islamist, or single-issue ideologies in 
the United States covering 1948-2018.”209 Its data is heavily relied upon by various academics 
and policymakers for a variety of reasons. With no evaluation of gender-based active ideological 
shooters documented over that seven-decade-long period, there is a clear gap in, not only their 
research criteria, but therefore in every analysis that references PIRUS as a primary source of 
information, as for example the works of Doering et al. and Becker as described in Chapter 2.  
The final study under evaluation in this chapter is Silva et al.’s “Gender-Based Mass 
Shootings: An Examination of Attacks Motivated by Grievances Against Women.” While their 
research makes a critical contribution to the field pertaining to active ideological shooters 
evaluated through a gender-based lens, they do not expand their criteria to consider or 
differentiate between mass shooters and terrorists. Instead, their four-part typology addresses 
both acts of emotionally (domestic violence) and ideologically (FEM-V) motivated events, but 
                                               
208 Gill et al., “Terrorist Use of the Internet by the Numbers,” 104. 
209 “Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS),” The National Consortium for the Study of 
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), accessed April 3, 2021, https://start.umd.edu/data-tools/profiles-
individual-radicalization-united-states-pirus.   
59 
misses the opportunity to draw distinctive lines between domestic violence perpetrators and 
those who should be considered terrorists. Therefore, researchers who cite their study risk 
another mis-categorization for FEM-V shooters.    
Capellan, “Lone Wolf Terrorist or Deranged Shooter?” 
Capellan’s 2015 study, “Lone Wolf Terrorist or Deranged Shooter?,” examined 
ideologically driven active shooter attacks in the United States from 1970 to 2014. Capellan 
assessed whether or not active shooter events documented during that nearly five-decade span 
should result in a new category of “lone wolf terrorism,” or if these actors should simply be 
labeled “deranged shooters” who are coincidentally ideological as well.210 To do this, Capellan 
examined 282 individuals across the lines of both ideological and non-ideological shooters, and 
concluded that the majority of ideological active shooters are “loners” motivated to attack by 
their respective ideologies. While more recently, national security policy has focused on 
prioritizing combating domestic violent extremism as it pertains to white supremacist 
extremism,211 as of 2015, the active ideological shooter phenomenon represented “the most 
dangerous threat to the national security of the United States,”212 according to the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security. 
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In order to properly assess individuals within the 1970 to 2014 timeframe, Capellan used 
criteria that combined both the Department of Homeland Security’s 2015 definition of an active 
shooter – someone “actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined or 
populated area”213 – with four additional elements of his own. They are as follows: 
1. It may involve more than one individual at multiple locations. 
2. It may include instances where the violence spills to other unintended victims. 
3. Failed attempts or attempts where victims were only wounded will be included. 
4. While the primary weapon must be a firearm, the offender is not limited to just 
firearms (e.g. knives, bats, explosives).214 
 
In order to address the ideological component of these actors, Capellan notes that an ideological 
active shooter “must hold extremists’ values and beliefs, but the event itself does not have to be 
ideologically motivated.”215  
 Capellan used various sources to create his dataset of 282 individuals, from “government 
reports, previous scholarship, and media reports of events that occurred between 1970 and June 
2014,”216 to his primary source, NYPD Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly’s “Active Shooter: 
Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation.” Kelly identified 324 events both 
successful and foiled between 1960 and 2012. Capellan cross-referenced Kelly’s dataset with his 
own ideological active shooter criteria, as well as with “over 50 sources, resulting in 57 
additional cases,”217 and then utilized eight online search engines to gather more specific 
information related to each offender and their respective cases. From there, Capellan’s dataset 
was more than sufficiently robust. 
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 His findings are as follows: Capellan’s active shooters were responsible for the deaths of 
905 individuals, and the injury of 1,094 individuals, with a noticeable, steady increase in these 
attacks since 1970; fifty-seven percent of the attacks occurred within the last decade of the 
research period.218 Regarding the shooters’ demographics, the great majority (over 59%) of both 
Capellan’s ideological and non-ideological shooters were white males in their 30s, who had 
experienced “rather dysfunctional adult lives,”219 and were “single/divorced, unemployed,” with 
low levels of education – high school was the highest level of education for 67.6% of non-
ideological active shooters and 51.5% of ideological active shooters.220 Future research should 
address the correlation between level of education and non-ideological versus ideological 
shooters. Capellan found that when it came to the execution stage, non-ideological shooters 
attacked people and places familiar to them, whereas ideological shooters “are more likely to 
attack people and places with which they have no prior personal or professional relationships.”221 
Ideological shooters are additionally more likely to utilize additional weapons, or a combination 
of weapons, in their attacks as well.  
Finally, Capellan assessed the specific ideologies associated with the ideological shooters 
in his dataset. This study was particularly significant because of the attacks between 1970 and 
2014, 70% were found to be motivated by ideological extremism.222 Of the individuals 
responsible for these attacks, “only seven attackers had formal ties with an extremist 
organization and only two attacks were perpetrated by wolf packs, composed of two individuals 
each time,”223 leaving the rest purely to loner attackers, as noted by Capellan. Not noted by 
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Capellan, however, was any indication that any of these attacks were motivated by gender-based 
ideologies. He did manage to find a singular event related to abortion, but without access to the 
case files, it is unclear whether the victim was the abortion doctor or the female patient. It is 
proven that between 1970 and 2014, ideological active shooters attacked in the United States 
driven by gender-based ideologies, seeking retribution against a society that never gave them a 
moment in the spotlight.  
Lastly, Capellan provides an entire table of data to categorize violent extremist ideologies 
and ideological motivations. He considered only far-right, jihadist inspired, black nationalist, and 
“other” under the “Ideological Connection” category, and only “Whites are Superior to Other 
Races,” “We are Near Apocalypse,” “Willingness to Die for Freedom,” “Hot Bottom Issue,” and 
“Black Revolution” under the “Belief System” category. Under “Specific Issue,” he included 
cases of anti-government, tax-related, anti-Western, abortion related, anti-race, and survivalist 
events. Finally, under “Target,” he selected government, civilians, business, and religious 
institutions. Future research should consider “FEM-V” under “Ideological Connection,” “Violent 
Misogyny” under “Belief System” and “Women” under the “Target” categories.     
Gill et al., “Terrorist Use of the Internet by the Numbers” 
Gill et al.’s title, “Terrorist Use of the Internet by the Numbers,” was promising, as it is 
becoming better known how internet savvy and particularly sophisticated in their use of online 
forums FEM-V actors have become. Ahead of Gill et al.’s research, various studies captured how 
terrorists used the internet, social media, online propaganda, and the like. However, until Gill et 
al., no study had looked at the actual records of internet use by individuals radicalized to the 
point of violence, such as which sites were visited and what content was posted. Thus, Gill et al. 
brought forth a new and innovative perspective on terrorists’ use of the internet, which was a 
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major contribution to the field of security studies. However, the manosphere has no formal, 
physical territory. The overarching community is found online. Since the emergence of the 
internet, their heightened use of online platforms suggests that Gill et al.’s research design would 
provide critical findings in manosphere actors’ online activity. Future research should take this 
into significant consideration.  
Gill et al. examined “223 convicted United Kingdom-based terrorists”224 who were both 
radicalized online and utilized the Internet for plotting attacks or inciting others to carry out 
violence in the name of an ideology. It is crucial to note that Gill et al. chose between two 
countries based on the availability of intelligence to be gathered related to their hypothesis – the 
United States and the United Kingdom. Ultimately, they chose the United Kingdom because 
there was simply more empirical data available related to United Kingdom actors.225  
Gill et al. included individuals “identified through several preexisting actor 
dictionaries,”226 which led them to aggregate al-Qaeda- and ISIS-inspired individuals into a 
singular “Jihadist-inspired” category in their dataset. They additionally aggregated “anti-
immigration, anti-government, anti-Muslim, and anti-Jewish”227 actors into a single “extreme 
right wing” category.  
Additional offenders were collected through the U.S. National Consortium for the Study 
of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism’s (START) Global Terrorism Database (GTD). 
Additionally, right-wing extremists and lone actors in particular were provided by Gill et al. 
Similar to START’s PIRUS, the GTD does not include an explicit violent extremist ideological 
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category for violent misogynistic actors.228 Gill et al.’s database focused on post-1990 events, 
and omitted Irish Republican actors, “as their online activities were rarely, if ever, mentioned in 
open-source reporting,”229 as well as left-wing extremists, as they were “next to impossible to 
identify . . . because of the lack of existing research on this phenomenon and because U.K. 
legislation tends to treat these offenders under criminal damage statutes.”230 Therefore, these 
actors were “subsumed under a wider category of non-politically-oriented offenders.”231 
Although Gill et al. addressed certain limitations ahead of their study, there was still no mention 
of any FEM-V-centric actors, events, ideologies, or barriers associated with Gill et al.’s research 
process.  
Therefore, while Gill et al. still published incredibly significant findings for the 
academics and policymakers in this field, future research should take the foundations of their 
work and consider approaching the same methodology through a FEM-V-oriented lens. While 
Gill et al. may continue their U.K.-based research, other academics should consider cross-
referencing North American and British findings. 
START’s PIRUS 
The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 
(START)’s Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) provides open-
source data through a spreadsheet and a codebook. The codebook proved to be more directly 
relevant for this study, since the bottom line is that PIRUS does not distinguish anti-woman 
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sentiment as a significant-enough motivating factor for it to be included as a standalone violent 
extremist ideology in their dataset.   
According to the PIRUS Codebook, the dataset itself consists of: 
a sample of individuals espousing Islamist, far right, far left, or single-issue 
ideologies who have radicalized within the United States to the point of 
committing ideologically motivated illegal violent or non-violent acts, joining a 
designated terrorist organization, or associating with an extremist organization 
whose leader(s) has/have been indicted of an ideologically motivated violent 
offense.232  
 
PIRUS assesses individuals – agnostic to any group affiliation – whose acts were primarily 
motivated to engage in violence by ideologies as labeled and categorized by START.  
START considers the terms “jihadist” and “jihadism” to be “inconsistently”233 applied 
throughout the field, and prefers the term “Islamist” for their study, but does not provide an 
explicit definition of this category. It would appear that Islamist implies the aggregation of 
“jihadism,” or “a militant methodology practiced by Sunni Islamist-Salafists”234 seeking to 
conquer non-Muslim forces and create an “Islamist society,”235 and “jihadists,” or those 
“connected to, or inspired by, violent Islamist-Salafist groups that have their roots in the onset of 
“global jihadism” of the 1980s, including al-Qaeda and its affiliated movements.”236 However, 
there was no other criteria or definition provided by START for this category to distinguish 
between the terms jihadist, jihadism, or Islamism. 
START refers to the “far right” category as an ideology that favors “social hierarchy, 
seeking an idealized future favoring a particular group, whether this group identity is racial, 
pseudo-national . . . or characterized by individualistic traits,”237 to include “radical individuals 
                                               
232 “PIRUS Codebook,” 3.  
233 “PIRUS Codebook,” 3. 
234 “PIRUS Codebook,” 4.  
235 “PIRUS Codebook,” 4.  
236 “PIRUS Codebook,” 4.   
237 “PIRUS Codebook,” 4.  
66 
linked to extremist religious groups,”238 “non-religious racial supremacists,” as well as “tax 
protesters, sovereign citizens, militias, and militant gun rights advocates.”239 They define “far 
left” movements as being “class-oriented,” and “consist[ing] primarily of individuals and groups 
that adhere to some form of Marxism-Leninism, i.e. some form of Communism.”240 The sharpest 
distinction made regarding far left versus far right according to START is that the identity of the 
far left is “grounded in economic grievances and not race-based issues,”241 and includes, for 
purposes of this database, animal rights and environmental extremists as well.  
Finally, START created a category for essentially “everyone else,” or actors they did not 
know how to categorize, the “single issue” offenders. According to the PIRUS criteria, these 
actors’ primary motivations distill down to a single issue, rather than an overarching ideology.242 
These single issues include, but are not limited to, “individuals associated with the Puerto Rican 
independence movement, anti-abortion extremists, members of the Jewish Defense League, and 
extremists with idiosyncratic ideologies.”243 While it is understandable that the existing 
scholarship on FEM-V-oriented actors have led START profilers to believe that FEM-V 
offenders exude idiosyncratic ideologies, “Boys Who Cry Wolf” sets out to not only reframe the 
criteria by which the FEM-V movement is categorized, but redefine the current criteria on 
assessing whether or not an act is one of terrorism or personal gain; they are not mutually 
exclusive for FEM-V acts of violence. A distinct category of acts motivated by misogynistic 
ideologies is needed. As a regular – and essentially primary – source used by various scholars in 
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the field such as Doering et al. and Becker, the foundation must be secure before others begin 
building.     
Silva et al., “Gender-Based Mass Shootings” 
Compared to the other datasets analyzed in this study, Silva et al. provides a much better 
example of where and how future research regarding the subject of gender-based active 
ideological shooters should go. However, they only create four typologies for the female-targeted 
shooter phenomenon rather than distinguishing between a general gender-based mass shooter 
and a gender-based terrorist. In their study, they sought to answer five research questions:   
What is the incidence rate of gender-based mass shooting attacks? What are the 
most common motivations for gender-based mass shooting attacks? Do gender-
based mass shooting motivations change over time? Do perpetrator and incident 
characteristics differ by gender-based mass shooting motivations? Do perpetrator 
and incident characteristics differ between gender-based mass shooting attacks 
and other mass shootings?244 
 
 Silva et al. begin by defining a “mass public shooting” as “an incident of gun violence, 
carried out by one or multiple shooters, in one or more public or populated locations, within a 
24-hr period,”245 with an additional criterion critical to this study: “the perpetrators also need to 
choose at least some of the victims at random and/or for their symbolic value.”246 Their criteria 
exclude violence related to profit-driven criminal activity, such as drug trafficking or gang 
shootings, state-sponsored violence, such as war or police shootings, or familicide.247 Silva et 
al.’s decision to include acts of domestic violence but exclude familicide is arguably inconsistent 
and misleading, since familicide can still relate to gender-based violence. Future research can 
and should assess this decision. 
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With these criteria in mind, Silva et al. created a dataset which examines “all mass 
shooting incidents” that occurred between 1966 and 2018. Silva et al. chose to begin in 1966 
because this was the year of the Texas Sniper – “considered the ‘first’ contemporary mass 
shooting.”248 That shooter’s day began with the murder of his wife and mother, before he turned 
his sights on the University of Texas. However, again, this was arguably a misleading choice for 
readers and future FEM-V research, because the murder of two family members not only borders 
on familicide (although he did not wipe out his entire family, two female family members are 
still significant), but also should not be considered ideological; in line with Silva et al.’s criteria, 
this was an act of specific-woman targeted violence, as will be discussed shortly. Future research 
should revise the Silva et al. dataset to begin with a more FEM-V-centric origin, and incorporate 
more language that addresses general mass shooters, general gender-based shooters, and gender-
based terrorists. 
Silva et al. used open-source data from the FBI and NYPD active shooter datasets, but 
only collected those acts where the lives of four or more victims were taken. The remainder of 
the offenders were discovered through various sources, such as government reports, scholarly 
datasets, peer-reviewed journal articles, news outlets, books, and online crowdfunded sources 
using the same criteria.249 Seven additional online search engines were used to gather more 
specific information about the dataset’s 311 case studies. 
Silva et al., as well as the other three studies assessed in this chapter, were selected from 
12 studies. The four included in this study were chosen as models for this research on the basis 
of close relevance to how the FEM-V phenomenon could best be comprehended and evaluated in 
future research as it pertains to actor-centric case files. Silva et al. specifically began to branch 
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out away from the bulk of studies in their guiding framework. Their study leaned on research 
centered around gender-based violence and mass shootings, which was used to help identify “any 
shooters who expressed grievances against women as a potential motivation for their 
shooting.”250 The individuals’ modi operandi were then evaluated. Motivations were “drawn 
from perpetrators’ words and actions before/during/after an incident,” through “manifestos, 
homemade videos, suicide notes, police evidence, and online profiles.”251  
Next, the documented grievances of shooters were evaluated and divided into two 
categories: specific grievances – or grievances against a specific woman – versus general 
grievances – or grievances “against women and/or feminist ideology.”252 This disaggregation led 
Silva et al. to create a categorization of four types of perpetrator motivations: (a) specific 
woman-targeted, such as the Seal Beach Hair Salon shooter in 2011, who targeted and murdered 
his ex-wife at her workplace, along with seven others; (b) specific woman-not targeted, such as 
the 2016 Excel Industries shooter who killed random coworkers and pedestrians but whose anger 
was brought on by his ex-girlfriend, who had filed a restraining order against him ninety minutes 
before his shooting spree; (c) general women-targeted, where Elliot Rodger was used as an 
example; and (d) general women-not targeted, with the example of the 2014 Georgia FedEx 
shooter who shot six random coworkers – four men and two women – with a suicide note 
articulating his hatred against women,253 but whose act did not actually target a specific woman 
or women in general, or mention issues with a specific woman who could have motivated his 
violence.254  
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As shown in Figure 2 below, Silva et al. concludes that almost half – 47%, or 50 events – 
were specific woman-targeted; and one-third, or 35 events, were specific woman-not targeted, 
leaving 9% for general women-targeted, and 11% for general women-not targeted. The latter two 
percentages, while not explicitly addressed by Silva et al., represent FEM-V perpetrators, 
suggesting that while the majority of the gender-based shooters assessed were not ideologically 
driven, they still represent 20% of overall gender-based shootings. Twenty-one deaths – twenty-
one civilian lives taken by stranger shooters – out of 106 deaths analyzed should indicate that 
future FEM-V research is crucial to better understanding and preventing this prevalent 
phenomenon.  
 
Figure 2: Motivations behind gender-based mass shootings255 
 
Figure 3 (see below) reveals patterns over time related to gender-based mass shootings in 
Silva et al.’s database that are noteworthy as well, but Silva et al. provide little historical context 
driving the numbers. Whereas in the 1960s and 1970s, Silva et al. notes that general women-
targeted represented between 25- and 33% of all gender-based incidents, they seemingly 
disappeared for the 1980s and have only slightly crept back in the decades to follow; Silva et al. 
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provide no explanation for this finding. By contrast, general women-not targeted was considered 
non-existent until the 1990s, and has maintained a general presence since it first emerged. No 
elaboration was provided here, either. Future research should capitalize on the presumed 
stagnation of general women-targeted events; a typology of shooters that once accounted for 
close to one-third of gender-based shootings overall, and now only accounts for 9% of gender-
based incidents. Contrastingly, future research should do a focused dive into the emergence of 
general women-not targeted events. Was Elliot Rodger’s general women-targeted event in 2014 
the resurgence of a seemingly dormant typology? Was the Georgia FedEx shooter in the same 
year somewhat predictable, based on the general women-not targeted typology’s origins and 
trajectory in and since 1990? What is to come from both or either typology? Further analysis into 
these shooters and their respective typologies could result in significant findings for the FEM-V 
phenomenon. 
Figure 3: Gender-based mass shooting motivations over time256  
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Overall, specific woman-targeted has been the most generally consistent and prevalent 
typology throughout the five decades of research and events, making up the majority of cases 
throughout (38-66%), with the exception of the 1970s, where they still represented a quarter of 
the incidents. Finally, specific woman-not targeted were the second most prevalent incidents 
throughout the study (38-50%). Further consideration – especially in regard to historical context 
– should be given to the patterns Silva et al. have presented, with particular attention given to 
Figures 1 and 2, to evaluate how the emergence of the internet and polarizing and isolating 
societal events have contributed to this gradual and consistent rise. 
Their general findings, as seen in Figure 4 below, reveal a significant increase in both 
gender-based mass shootings and mass shootings in general from 1966 to 2018. According to 
Silva et al.’s research, 106, or 34%, of mass shooters during a five-decade-period were gender-
based, with a steady increase from 3 GBV shooters in the 1960s, to four in the 1970s, to 24 
shooters in the 2000s, to 48 shooters in the 2010s (up through 2018). Put more bluntly, “the past 
9 years examined in this study have experienced an almost equal number of gender-based 
shootings (45%) as the preceding decades combined.”257 However, there is little academic or 
legal consensus on the definition of a “mass shooting,” which allows room for scholars to assess 
figures with their own conscious or subconscious biases towards gun violence. Therefore, while 
still a significant study overall, the reader should be wary of potential anti- or pro-gun bias. 
                                               
257 Silva et al., “Gender-Based Mass Shootings,” 10.  
73 
 
Figure 4: Number of gender-based MS (mass shooting) attacks over time (N = 106) 258 
 
Silva et al. additionally examined motivations for gender-based mass shootings. Across 
the four categories of offender types, three characteristics were of particular note: race, 
relationship status, and history with domestic violence. Aside from specific-woman targeted 
shooters, the offenders were overwhelmingly white. Relationship statuses were dynamic across 
the board; however, general women-targeted shooters were more likely to be single. 
Additionally, specific woman-targeted shooters “were at least twice as likely to have a history of 
domestic violence (56%) than all other gender-based shooters.”259 Silva et al. also identified two 
significant and contrasting characteristics across the four types: spree attacks and fatalities. 
Whereas specific woman-targeted shootings were more likely to be spree attacks – presumably 
due to perpetrators targeting a known victim in a familiar location, and then going on a spree in 
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another location – general women-not targeted shooters led in average number of fatalities (10 
deaths), versus their counterparts (3-5 deaths).260 
Finally, Silva et al. compared the 106 gender-based mass shooters with the remaining 205 
general mass shooters (see Figure 5). It should be noted that across these two phenomena, male 
shooters were the gender overwhelmingly responsible for the documented crimes (96-100%). 
Less obvious findings between the two phenomena pertain to the individuals’ respective personal 
lives and the likelihood of suicide. Over a quarter of gender-based shooters were separated or 
divorced, whereas general mass shooters were only 10% likely to be in the “single” category. 
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Figure 5: Comparison of Gender-Based MS and General MS261 
 
Not completely surprising given the overwhelming prevalence of both specific woman-
targeted and specific woman-not targeted, but still quite noteworthy, are the two following 
findings: gender-based shooters were “less likely to be single (41%) than their counterparts 
(69%),”262 and they were also more likely to have children than other mass shooters (36% versus 
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20%, respectively). Silva et al. noted that the finding regarding children was exceptionally 
significant, given that “no other mass shooting study to date has examined whether or not 
shooters have children.”263 While a significant contribution to the overall field assessing gender-
based violence, Silva et al.’s focus on specific woman-targeted and not targeted also skews the 
focus away from FEM-V perpetrators, or the general women-targeted and not targeted 
categories.  
Additionally, gender-based shooters were 26% more likely to have a history of domestic 
violence than general mass shooters (41% versus 15%, respectively), which also seems to 
correlate with the findings regarding substance abuse history: gender-based shooters were more 
likely to have struggled with substance abuse (39%) than their counterparts (22%). But 
ultimately, the greatest difference between gender-based mass shooters and general mass 
shooters involved the suicide rates during the attacks. Gender-based shooters were predictably 
“more likely to commit suicide at the end of their attack (46%) than other mass shooters 
(31%).”264 However, Silva et al.’s primary focus on cases of domestic violence as it pertains to 
gender-based violence potentially leads to further lack of consensus in this area of academia. By 
incorporating four typologies – two of which are domestic violence-driven, and two are 
ideologically driven – but not explicitly deciphering between their significant differentiations, 
there is a greater risk of FEM-V actors continuing to be hidden within general gender- and active 
shooter-based analyses. These actors have found a more categorized place within Silva et al.’s 
analysis, but still have yet to be completely acknowledged for who they really are: terrorists.  
Silva et al.’s research was a major step in the right direction for this area of research and 
its various stakeholders. This research was also published in early 2021 – the same time this 
                                               
263 Silva et al., “Gender-Based Mass Shootings,” 12.  
264 Silva et al., “Gender-Based Mass Shootings,” 12.   
77 
thesis was being written. Nevertheless, there is still much work to be done. Silva et al. provides a 
general overview of four different types of shooters that are either ideologically or emotionally 
driven by grievances against a known woman or women in general. While helpful to the overall 
focus of active ideological shooter studies, Silva et al. does not take an explicit stance 
deciphering between acts of deflected or direct domestic violence – or specific women targeted 
and not targeted, driven by a specific woman or multiple women familiar to the shooter – and 
acts of FEM-V terrorism, specifically the general women targeted and not targeted events. Future 
research should acknowledge the latter two categories for what they are: the general targeting of 
a civilian population: women. The latter two categories are acts of terrorism, and should be 
evaluated as such. 
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Chapter Five: The Conclusion 
The threat posed by violent extremism has substantially evolved over the years 
and particularly rapidly recently. These changes are only partly driven by the 
nature of . . . terrorist groups. They are also driven by changes in technologies 
available . . . we can predict one thing with certainty: the threat will continue to 
evolve. Predicting how it will evolve is a somewhat more difficult challenge.  
– Cori E. Dauber and Mark D. Robinson, Chapter 5 of “Online Terrorist Propaganda, 
Recruitment, and Radicalization,” 2019265 
 
In the words of Gill et al., “even for a field as bereft of empiricism as terrorism studies, 
the striking lack of data is surprising.”266 Insofar as their statement pertains to this particular 
study, the “striking lack” pertains to the gap caused by a massive misinterpretation of the extant 
literature on gender-based active ideological shooters. 
Lessons Learned Regarding Ongoing Efforts to Acknowledge and Combat FEM-V Actors 
Given Chapters Two and Four of this thesis, there are two primary lessons to be learned 
regarding ongoing efforts to acknowledge and combat the FEM-V phenomenon. The first 
involves the “CSIS Public Report 2019,” in which gender-driven violence has been included as a 
subtopic inside one of Canada’s three overarching categories of violent extremist ideologies: 
Religiously Motivated Violent Extremism (RMVE), Politically Motivated Violent Extremism 
(PMVE), and Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism (IMVE); Canada is leading the allied 
countries in denouncing the use of partisan spectrums to assess these violent extremist 
ideologies. The Canadian Government explicitly states that, “given the diverse combination of 
motivations and personalized worldviews of recent mass-casualty attackers, the use of such 
terms as ‘right-wing’ and ‘left-wing’ is not only subjective, but inaccurate in describing the 
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complexity of motivations of IMVE attacks in Canada and abroad.”267 Finally, under the IMVE 
category, gender-driven violence is described as “violent misogyny (including incel) and anti-
LGBTQ violence.” 268 However, simply adopting Canada’s posture is not sufficient; the IMVE 
category puts forth two, arguably very different ideologies inside of the gender-driven violence 
category. In order to properly acknowledge and combat future FEM-V events, academics and 
policymakers must leave little grey area when assessing this phenomenon. Nevertheless, the 
United States should take note of Canada’s policy efforts surrounding this phenomenon. 
The second promising framework that supports the perspective of this study derives from 
Silva et al. and their 2021 study. Their literature review supports the assessment argued here, and 
they provide criteria for different types of gender-based active shooters through their gender-
based mass shooting typology. Nevertheless, Silva et al. prioritizes the two emotionally driven 
categories – specific-woman targeted and specific woman-not targeted – and does not address 
the elephant – or wolf – in the room: the two ideologically driven categories of general women-
targeted and general women-not targeted shooters; therein lies the FEM-V terrorists that need to 
be more explicitly acknowledged. 
The four datasets assessed in Chapter Four of this thesis prove that while many 
significant contributions have been made in the area of active shooter tracking and monitoring, 
there must be a reevaluation of those datasets focused on violent extremist ideologies based on a 
consideration of potential FEM-V motivations.  
Implications 
This research demonstrates the importance of answering these questions: Is the lack of 
interpreting active ideological shooters through a gendered lens proportional to the prevalence or 
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frequency of the threat FEM-V actors pose in North America? How thoroughly examined is the 
active ideological shooter phenomenon? Are there existing and robust datasets that incorporate 
all active ideological threats based on the ideologies that motivate extremist shooters? What, in 
other words, is the value added of having such a category? Finally, what should academic 
researchers working on this topic take away from this study?  
To address the first question is not to make a claim that the researchers in this field are 
misogynistic. Rather, the question is meant to underscore the fact that the severe lack of 
interpretation of active ideological shooters through a gendered lens is in fact not proportional to 
the threat these types of actors pose; they are indeed prevalent and are therefore worth 
considering under the FEM-V framework and respective criteria. This would make it possible to 
better profile, trace, and combat these actors. 
This study also addresses the lengths to which the active ideological shooter phenomenon 
has been previously examined. While various datasets included in this paper have made, and will 
continue making, significant contributions to the security field, it is also important to 
acknowledge the major gap that had existed in the extant literature before this study was 
published. To not consider violent misogyny as a significant enough link to the plethora of cases 
evaluated is to not fully comprehend the active ideological shooter phenomenon.     
The third question this study pertains to is the level of value gained from the inclusion of 
datasets incorporating all active ideological threats based on the ideologies that motivate 
extremist shooters. The concrete value is enormous because, as made apparent in this study, the 
big picture of the overall lone-actor grievance-fueled phenomenon had been missing a critical 
piece. “Boys Who Cry Wolf” offers the foundation that can and should be incorporated into 
future research on this overarching phenomenon. 
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Lastly, to other academic researchers focused on this topic, the most significant point that 
should be taken away from this study is that so much of the groundwork has already been laid by 
earlier researchers. That being said, necessary linkages between the various disciplines of serial 
killer characteristics, women’s and gender studies, and counterterrorism had not been drawn until 
this study. Without those connections, murderers will fall through the legal cracks, continuing in 
their anonymity as it pertains to active ideological shooter studies, and strengthening their “dog 
whistles,” potentially intensifying their calls to action.   
Limitations 
Four case studies and four primary dataset studies can only reveal so much about the 
FEM-V phenomenon, not only as it is currently represented and dispersed across various 
disciplines, but also as it currently stands in regard to the level of threat posed by FEM-V actors. 
A broader scope of each time period included, from Berkowitz in December of 1975 to Kaufman 
in September of 2020, as well as a more actor-centric approach regarding the lack of qualitative, 
actor-centric data available, would allow for a much more holistic comprehension of the FEM-V 
and gender-based active ideological shooter phenomena. Given the limits of this study, including 
time, accessibility, and the COVID-19 pandemic, important cases and analyses may well have 
been overlooked; neither Silva et al. nor Kaufman would have been identified and included in 
this study if not for the continued monitoring of the FEM-V environment during this writing 
process.   
Future Research 
This study prompts a number of questions and thus recommendations for future studies 
that could produce significant contributions for various stakeholders in the security studies field. 
Datasets gathered when FEM-V was not considered as a stand-alone violent extremist ideology 
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can and should be reassessed, and other researchers should gather more empirical data on FEM-
V active shooters, now that a conceptual framework has been put forth by this study. 
Specifically, Capellan could reexamine his extensive dataset, while adding explicit 
criteria for FEM-V motivations, as previously recommended in Chapter Four. PIRUS can and 
should also include FEM-V or gender-based violence as a stand-alone motivating force, rather 
than a subcategory of “single-issue” ideologies. Gill et al. could reassess their study of terrorists’ 
use to incorporate manosphere groups and members, since they are primarily existent within 
these online communities. Silva et al. could create a new study based on their 2021 publication 
that hones in on the general women-targeted and not targeted shooters, based on the criteria 
provided in this study, and provide further historical context for the trajectory of the respective 
typologies. Lastly, all academics and policymakers in this community can and should use this 
foundational concept to create policy, reform legal procedures and labeling, and ultimately 
change the narrative of FEM-V shooters. 
Recommendations and Lessons Learned 
Based on this research project, the following observations and recommendations can be 
offered: the lone wolf phenomenon is too ambiguous and thus is too overcrowded. The overuse 
of the phenomenon has led to relevant violent extremist ideologies such as FEM-V being 
overlooked, which is particularly important, given that the threat may well be more prevalent in 
2021, with the COVID-19 pandemic bringing forth polarizing divisions. This is in part because 
so many people have faced more screen time in isolation, producing a greater risk of online 
radicalization across the various violent extremist ideologies that present great threats to national 
and international security today.269  
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FEM-V shooters did not just emerge from the woodwork in 2014 in the hopes of 
following Elliot Rodger’s lead. They have been here all along – they have just been disguised 
and dispersed throughout various literatures and labels. Their acts of violence have earned a 
stand-alone category. They can no longer be considered under far-right, alt-right, single-issue, 
miscellaneous, or the like. They are no longer “lone wolves,” they are FEM-V terrorists. 
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